That Pakistan had a part to play in the Mumbai attacks should surprise no one that is familiar with previous attacks in India. The most vivid is the 2001 attack on India’s Parliament, following which India mobilized its army. After several months on the brink of war, both sides pulled back, with Pakistan providing commitments to control terrorists within its borders. As we now know, those commitments were false.

Faced with repeated failures to contain Pakistan, what is India to do?

Setting the Ground Rules
Despite the desire to exact revenge, any action by India must be measured on more than the pain it inflicts. Rather, as Condoleezza Rice said, “any response needs to be judged by its effectiveness in prevention and also by not creating other unintended consequences or difficulties.” What is need, in other words, is a strategy to “manage” Pakistan, rather than to retaliate to it.

So far, India’s response has been measured and calm. India has depended on the US to exert influence on Pakistan, yielding some results. Pakistan has arrested Lashkar terrorists, closed offices of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and placed its founder (Hafiz Mohammad) under house arrest. India’s maturity in avoiding military retaliation is good news. After all, we have tried military mobilization before and gained nothing. An outright military intervention not only risks escalation into a nuclear conflict, it would be counter-productive – alienating liberal forces within the establishment while uniting the country against India.

There is, however, a second yardstick by which action must be measured. It must send a clear message to Pakistan that support of terror is not a viable option. As Pranab Mukherjee has said, “mere expression of intention is not adequate.” That those responsible may have been non-state actors is irrelevant. Action by India must clarify that non-state actors are the responsibility of States that harbor them. Even if the state in question – Pakistan – is only in partial control of its apparatus, that does not excuse those in charge, of their responsibility.

This analysis suggests India’s response must balance two opposing forces. First, India must send an unequivocal message that it is serious about its security and will punish those it sees as responsible. Simultaneously, however, India must accept that Pakistan is a state teetering on the edge of failure – and in some regions it is a failed state. Extreme reactions, such as military intervention, risk aggravating that situation.

Building A Strategy
So far, India has borne the brunt of this tradeoff. Under US pressure India did not cross the LoC during the Kargil war, did not take direct military action in 2001, and has avoided a similar action this year. The status quo has favored Pakistan.

This must change. Indeed, India’s strategy must be two pronged. First, India must change the status quo, using Mumbai as an excuse to dramatically shift negotiating power in its favor. Second, Pakistan must be made to face this tradeoff as well. By offering both carrots and sticks, India must drive home the point that Pakistan has choices and stands to loose everytime it condones terror against India.

Sizing Response Options: The Stick
So, where does this leave us? There are several ideas India can employ, as potential sticks:

• Inflict Economic Pain: Perhaps the easiest retaliation is non-military. India has several economic tools at its disposal, including stopping all imports from Pakistan, banning overflight by Pakistani airlines, and significantly restricting travel between the two countries. No doubt, Pakistan will retaliate, but the pain will be asymmetrically more for Pakistan.
• Covert Retaliation: In the immediate aftermath of Mumbai, some commentators suggested that India follow Israel’s example, after the Munich massacre, of covertly hunting down those responsible. Indeed, India should prepare for such action. It is doubtful if India has the capabilities for such an operation. Nevertheless such an action would carry many benefits, despite Pakistan’s efforts to prosecute those responsible. Not only will it force India to upgrade its capabilities, it will also be a useful backup option should Pakistan later release those responsible. It would be a clear signal to Pakistan (and the USA) that if it does not act, India will.
• “Surgical” Strikes: The logical escalation of covert operations is actual military intervention. One option is to conduct “surgical” strikes in Pakistan, but particularly in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) at suspected terror camps. This can be done. India seems to know with reasonable certainty where these camps are. Yet, such strikes risk uniting Pakistan against India, strengthening the fundamentalists, and most critically, alienating India globally. Consider, after all, that US airstrikes in Pakistan’s west are already highly controversial. Strikes by India, the country’s arch enemy, would weaken Zardari while strengthening those elements in the ISI that have long supported Laskhar and their brethren. This, therefore, would be foolhardy and probably defines the threshold that India cannot easily cross.
• All-out Assault: There is one exception where a military assault on Pakistan should be considered – in the immediate aftermath of a Mumbai-style attack. Should such an attack happen again, India can – and should – launch a limited but intense attack on the PoK. Of course, such an assault would have to be limited to Kashmir, have clear geographical objectives, and be ceased unilaterally within hours or days to avoid escalation. Nevertheless, by taking back occupied territory India can improve its strategic position and change the status quo that has long been in Pakistan’s favor.

Sizing Response Options: The Carrot
Of course, giving Pakistan “the stick” is counter-productive, without a few carrots as well. So, here’s a few:

• Sharing Intelligence: In the past Pakistan has always demanded that India share intelligence to backup its claims that attacks are supported from within Pakistan. India should oblige and call Pakistan’s bluff. Indeed, to the extent possible, India should make some intelligence public. Not only will this substantiate India’s case globally, it would eliminate one more excuse for inaction by Pakistan. India can then demand intelligence in return – and again measure if its rivals words are mere “expression of intent.”
• Joint Military Exercises: As an out-of-the box method, why not propose joint military exercises with Pakistan’s government, and possibly joint patrols in the border regions of India – and Afghanistan? Obviously, this won’t happen overnight given Pakistan’s suspicions. Nevertheless, it would give India the opportunity to size up its neighbor’s intentions – to prevent cross-border terrorism. Should it become evident that Pakistan is not living up to its side of the bargain, in stopping infiltration, India could then take retaliatory measures.
• Economic Free Trade Zone: The strongest incentive India can offer - and should offer immediately - is economic. For instance, President Zardari indicated an interest in creating a free-trade zone. Such a plan has long been under discussion. Now, India should unilaterally offer to cut tariffs on all Pakistani imports. Pakistan would benefit in the short term but this would strengthen moderate elements in Pakistan. Best of all, it would give India additional future leverage over Pakistan, by making the threat of sanctions that much more painful.

Retaliation Is a Balancing Act
The Mumbai attacks have led to a lot of soul searching in India, resulting in some very creative thinking (for instance, some have suggested a reunification of South Asia). It is a testament to Indians’ desire for peace that, rather than baying for blood, they are thinking positive. Nevertheless, Indian policymakers must operate within the realm of reality.

But India cannot, and should not, depend on US pressure alone to alter Pakistan’s track record of harboring terrorists.

Having all but ruled out military action, India has given Pakistan’s government the necessary cover to pursue terrorists domestically without alienating itself. But India cannot, and should not, depend on US pressure alone to alter Pakistan’s track record of harboring terrorists. After all, Pakistan’s army seems to doublecross itself and the Americans. So it is highly likely that once that pressure is gone Pakistan will return to its erring ways. To avoid that, what is needed is a long-term, sustained, and consistent policy on rewarding Pakistan for good behavior and punishing it for bad.

India should start by offering a range of incentives that draw the two countries close. This will strengthen Pakistan’s liberals and, if nothing else, stabilize the country – a result India should desire anyway. Nevertheless, India must simultaneously prepare for, and execute, covert operations that provide India a “second” lever.

This is the conclusion of a series of articles on the Mumbai attacks. Previous articles looked at what went wrong and lessons for India’s domestic security apparatus.

Slowly a picture has emerged of how the Mumbai attacks were planned and executed, mostly in Pakistan. The NY Times highlights evidence that Pakistan was the source of the attackers and the group behind it had received substantial support from the ISI. The report quotes not just the Mumbai police, but former Defense Department officials.

A picture is also emerging of the “rot” in India’s own criminal justice and intelligence systems, pointed out most effectively by the BBC.

The attacks and their aftermath again point to the rot that has set into the country’s internal security system and a lack of cohesion between civilian and security wings of the government…One telling example: six days after the attack, even the number of dead and injured keeps going up and down, due to poor co-ordination between the police and hospitals.

The Prime Minister has pledged to act with “resolve and determination” but what does that mean? The temptation to lean on Pakistan is strong, yet India’s government might do better to learn a few basic lessons first. Here are a few.

Win the Information War

First, learn to win the war for world opinion. This should hardly be difficult, given the immense sympathy India has garnered over the attacks. Yet, the government can bungle this too.

For one, constant allusions to “external elements” and “neighbors” do not help. India has made it a habit of crying wolf and pointing to Pakistan everytime anything goes wrong. This, unfortunately, increases the burden of proof on India. That India pointed to Pakistan within hours of the attacks suggested either prior knowledge or - more likely to the public eye - the usual fearmongering. That is why an NY Times article is more credible when it quotes the US Defense Department, than the Mumbai police or Shivraj Patil. Make your words count.

Second, be consistent and professional in releasing information. If there is one thing that marked the operations in Mumbai, it was the many contradictory statements released in turn by the head of the NSG, an Army General, the Mumbai police commissioner, and the Home Minister. Protecting the credibility of information is as important as protecting the information. It was never clear who exactly was in charge of the operations, leading the bystander to believe that no one was in charge.

Finally, control the channels by which information is released. Is it not surprising that to find “evidence” of Pakistan’s involvement, one has to go to the NYTImes? Why is the Home Ministry not releasing the evidence and ensuring that its security officials not “leak” information to the press?

Get Security Right

Winning the information war is about getting perceptions right - that India’s authorities are in control and not simply smoking pot when they accuse Pakistan. If India can convince the US and Pakistan that it knows what it is doing, it will also convince them of the earnestness of India’s words - and if necessary, threats.

But you cannot have others believe you are serious if your house is in disarray. And India’s security apparatus certainly is. Nine hours for the NSG to get to Mumbai, three days to get the terrorists, and another two days to clear out bombs from the train station at Mumbai!

To be taken seriously, India must fix its anti-terror mechanism. And a first step is to invest heavily in the local police. The local policeman is India’s first defense against crime and terror. It is these people - long reviled and under paid - who face the first bullets, secure crime scenes, and call in the big guns. You cannot expect to be safe if these people are not motivated to protect you. Fixing the local police will not be easy, nor cheap. It requires that every state pay its policemen more, invest in better training, offer better equipment and a safer work environment, and improve communications across state police and military intelligence divisions. The creation of a “federal” agency or a stronger law is useless, if we cannot catch the people to begin with.

Second, leverage technology. Britain’s enthusiastic adoption of video surveillance in the 1990’s, in response to IRA attacks, shows how successful it can be - at least in managing the aftermath. Today, London has over 10,000 cameras, and Britain over 4 million (1 for every 14 people - the highest in the world). The cost of technology, critical to coordinating first-response between fire, medical, and police services, is dropping exponentially. There is really no excuse for why India’s police forces still operate with WWII era walkie talkies.

Third, upgrade the NSG to be one of the best anti-terror response units in the world. India is one of the most frequently attacked countries - it needs to have a matching capability. Yet, in the BBC article a security analyst illustrates how the NSG have no dedicated aircraft and insufficient training in responding to a Mumbai-style attack:

The commandos have been trained to rescue small groups of people. “They have not been trained on multiple location operations of such scale.”

Four, India needs to be creative in its training of the NSG - and this will come from working with more creative partners. Why not train with Israeli and US security forces on a regular basis? Their agencies, amongst the best in the world, would not only be willing to share intelligence, but also tactics. Mumbai shows that whether we like it or not, the terrorists see us as one group of enemies. So it is time we embraced our new allies.

Finally, the NSG should be a dedicated anti-terror unit, not a team meant to provide protective cover to corrupt politicians. In the USA, the Secret Service does not conduct anti-terror operations, just as SWAT, Seal, and other special forces teams do not provide individual protection services. The former is dedicated to protecting key people, the latter to anti-terror operations. Likewise, the NSG should not be wasted on protecting corrupt politicians, the bulk of whom should be protected by local police. And, doing so would have the added benefit of creating incentives for politicians to improve local law enforcement.

Mumbai: An Opportunity to Reflect

Mumbai was a wake-up call. It seems increasingly likely that the attack was planned in Pakistan, yet the inability to prevent it or to respond effectively was a domestic failure. It brings home the rot, not only in our police system, but in our politics.

In such an environment, it is easy to lash out at an “external party” and in time India must do so. Yet, Mumbai offers us the opportunity to look within before we look without. India’s first act of determination must be to set our own house in order. It will be difficult and politically tricky for the Congress to admit to lapses. But if the government is serious about tackling terror, they must follow the advice of an earstwhile opponent, Iqbal:

Khudi ko kar buland itna ke har taqdeer se pehle khuda bande se khud poochhe bata teri raza kya hai

…fascinating experiment with a new Google tool on the frontiers of diseases surveillance and global health trends. Remains to be seen how useful this will be and lots of validation needs to be done, but this is yet another example of people outside of traditional health/public health communities who are on the leading edge of public health innovation.

Anyway, that set me thinking on what else Google is up to. Turns out, its fairly easy to find out. So what I did was aggregate their projects, and analyze the resulting spending. Here’s what I found out.

Spending and Type

Google.org spending, by type

Google.org has provided USD 110,225,998 in grants and investments. This itself is hardly a huge figure, considering the size of Google, and the ambitions of Google.org. What is interesting is that a large part of this (44%) was spent as investments into renewable energy and plugin hybrid projects.

This makes me wonder why Google.org is spend so much on the “low lying” fruit?

Field of Activity

Google.org spending by field of activity

A look at which areas Google.org spends its money is also illuminating. Again, it seems a large part goes to energy related projects. I have classified energy as renewable energy as well as power related (e.g. plugin-hybrid) projects.

Relatively little is spent on “traditional” philanthropy - health, education, or environment. Again, is there a capacity constraint?

One additional remark: it seems Google.org is funding the World Bank as well. The World Bank Development Marketplace business plan competition received USD 500,000 from Google.

Recipient Country

Recipient organization, by country

A look at the distribution of grants, by the country in which organizations are based, is particularly interesting. A few observations:

• It is not surprising that a majority of money goes to US organizations. The US has one of the most developed non-profit and academic sectors. But the scale of that majority is.
• India, curiously, is the second largest recipient of Google.org grants. In hindsight, probably not surprising considering India too has a vibrant civil society and an ambitious social agenda.
• Africa gets the third largest share (USD 7.4 million). Of this, USD 4.2 million goes to East Africa (about 56.7%). It should be noted, though, that a larger amount is probably spent in Africa than in India - because several of the US grants are for projects in Africa.
• Most of the grants to India are in the field of education. Most going to Africa are in the field of health.
• Finally, one thing not evident in these numbers is that Google.org often funds technology related projects. HealthMap, for instance, gets two grants. Other grants also focus on weather monitoring, satellite monitoring, and other climate systems that feed into disease control systems. Clearly, the Flu project isn’t Google.org’s only innovation.

In concluding, I can make two overarching statements.

First, Google.org’s spending suggests there is an absorption capacity constraint within the broader non-profit sector. Could it be that there just aren’t enough good projects for Google to fund?

And second, while a majority of projects benefit the developing world, the US-centric spending pattern suggests Google.org is embracing Jagdish Bhagwati’s idea, that if you cannot spend in Africa, spend for Africa, elsewhere:

But leaving aside its cultural or anthropological implications, this reform is complete nonsense from a legal point of view and another example of how little substance the new Constitution of Ecuador has. As the Ecuadorian jurist Xavier Flores mentions:

It is completely inappropriate to confer rights without correlate obligations (what kind of duties can we demand from lakes or rivers?). But even worse is to confer rights to an entity that cannot exercise them.

The new constitutional article tries to solve this problem by stating that human beings can act as proxies, and grants these proxies the right to sue on behalf of an ecosystem. To justify this the Ecuadorian legislators used as an analogy the case of legal persons (companies, foundations, NGOs, etc.), which are represented by physical persons.

First, this analogy is incorrect from a legal perspective because legal persons constitute an extension of the rights of the physical persons that create or administer them - and not the other way around. This is obviously not the case of nature.

Second, this legal inconsistency also translates itself into a practical problem: how is it going to be decided who has the right to represent nature? Since there is no ownership tie here, this might become an impossible task, particularly considering that there will be competing interests over any given case. Take, for example, the case of an environmental activist who wants to present a lawsuit on nature’s behalf against the construction of a dam. Should this person be granted this right, even when local communities close to the future dam site express their agreement with the construction, due to the benefits it would bring?

The expression of principles is a part of any constitution. But that is not going to protect the environment. Instead of creating simple declarations of principles without any legal validity or practical application the members of Ecuador’s Constituent Assembly should have come up with effective mechanisms to protect the environment.

The WSJ goes into excruciating details of how India’s license Raj is stiffling education and education providers.

“There is a quiet crisis in higher education in India that runs deep,” said Sam Pitroda, chairman of commission, in a report. “The system as a whole is overregulated.”

India’s national and state governments are pouring billions of dollars into expanding higher education. The Indian government, which funds about a third of India’s public higher-education costs (states pay the rest), plans a ninefold increase in spending to $17 billion over the next five years, according to a plan unveiled in 2007.

But reducing the bureaucratic burden on the sector won’t be easy. Any change in the powers of the All India Council for Technical Education requires a vote of Parliament, whose members can derive influence by pressuring educational institutions to admit children of supporters, several officials of colleges and college boards say.

“Education is a vote-getting patronage item,” says Ajit Rangnekar, deputy dean of the Indian Business School. That school, launched in 2001 with the support of India’s business elite, isn’t under the purview of the Council for Technical Education.

So far so good - that politicians and beauracrats use their position for power is hardly surprising. So yes, overregulation is a problem. And if lower regulation helped the boom in telecommunications, it is natural to expect it will also help education. But how far is enough?

Atanu goes too far in concluding that if too much government is bad then no government whatsoever must be the only way forward. The idea, that has been espoused often by many free-market economists, is that unbridled privatization of education will save us all.

To a certain extent, this assertion comes down to ideology - privatization has been en vogue. Yet, with the pendulum swinging the other way in America and elsewhere amid calls for greater regulation of everything one must pause to at least review if the alternative is so great.

Second, the suggestion that privatization is in itself a solution is too simplistic. India’s colleges suffer from red tape. However, they also suffer from lack of resources, a general paucity of trained teachers, a social framework that no longer values teachers (as it did gurus), and extreanous calls upon the attentions of teachers. The idea that the withdrawal of the government will solve all of these problems is disingenous. As Martin Carnoy had commented with regard to education vouchers:

I would like to believe, with Professor West, in a panacea that could make everyone learn more without investing enormous time and effort in improving children’s nutrition, home lives, and the way all schools deliver knowledge. Our task as educators and social reformers would be that much simpler. Unfortunately, vouchers tend to divert attention from the overall complexity of the learning problem rather than providing a real solution.

Altbach and Jayaram provide a more balanced perspective in the Hindu. Theirs is a perspective on the specific initiative (that the WSJ mentions) - the creation of world class universities. The article pokes quite a few holes into the governments strategy. Yet, it concludes

The challenges facing the creation of world-class universities are daunting. Indeed, if India is to succeed as a great technological power with a knowledge-based economy, world-class universities are required. The first step, however, is to examine the problems and create realistic solutions. Spending large sums scattershot will not work. Nor will copying the American academic model succeed.

This is a more realistic view. But it also highlights why privatization in education will not be so easy. In India, universities have not merely been vehicles for enhancing competitiveness of a “knowledge economy.” They have had at least as important a role to play in social cohesion by providing a secular curriculum and the appearence of equal access. If we are to change that role, it cannot be done without a debate on the pros and cons.

Finally, there is one more argument against complete privatization. By all means, the government is responsible for the failure of higher education. But there are two responses to that failure - ask the government to withdraw, or hold it accountable to its citizens. I much prefer the latter. Certainly, it may not be the easier of the two, but it is how democracies should work.

My premise is that P4P promises to bypass traditionally inefficient and government controlled food markets, providing farmers the right incentives to improve productivity - with benefits to both consumers and producers. So far so good.

CGDev too agrees, highlighting the three assumptions underlying the program:

that markets don’t work very well;

that establishing an alternative sales mechanism is an effective means of improving markets and producers’ incomes; and

that local purchases will improve producers’ prices, but with a minimal impact on consumers’ prices.

As this illustrates, enthusiasm for P4P is based on a very producer-centric view, and overlooks the very real possiblity - particularly in small African countries where P4P purchases would be a substantial portion of total trade - that P4P’s impact on local consumer prices might not be negligible. In their article on CGDev, Jenny Aker and Rebecca Schutte highlight with the example of Mali:

On the surface, Mali appears to be a perfect pilot country for the P4P Initiative: relatively low yields and unstable production; low and variable producer prices and hence incomes; and extremely vulnerable populations, some of which require food aid. But is the P4P right for Mali? Despite poor quality roads and high transport costs, grain markets are fairly well-integrated and competitive in Mali. The P4P could potentially improve farmers’ incomes and encourage greater trade within Mali. But at the same time:

1. Higher prices paid to farmers via the P4P could undercut traders if they are unable to meet WFP’s prices, displace smaller traders and potentially break traditional relationships between traders and villages, or keep such relationships from developing.
2. Depending upon annual production and the location, amount and prices of the local purchase, such purchases could reduce supply and increase consumer prices locally and in other markets.

The impact of P4P on local consumption is an unintended consequence that I have overlooked. It is what makes the program a “win-maybe” rather than a “win-win” according to the authors.

Yet, I feel this potential obstacle can be overcome if, as I argued previously, the program is not focused on the farmers or the producers - but on the market. Its goal should be the eventual emergence of an efficient market.

There is a parallel between P4P and the emergence of direct purchase contracts between rural farmers and large retailers in India. Those contracts, like P4P, are driven by the inefficiency of markets and the need (on both sides) for long-term stability in prices. In the short term, these contracts benefit producers and enhance their productivity.

However, to turn those into lasting benefits and provide ALL consumers and producers the same benefits, these contracts need to be merged into a single marketplace. This is where P4P should go. Rather than trying to benefit a certain subset of farmers, the program should become a clearing house for ALL purchases in a given country. By making long-term purchases the norm, it would lead to a “race to the top” - buyers would be forced to match WFP’s terms of long-term prices, and producers would be forced to improve productivity. All consumers would benefit.

Of course, it remains to be decided if the short term negative impact on consumers is outweighed by the long term benefits of a better marketplace. And is an efficient agricultural marketplace really good? When the global price for coffee fell dramatically in the last century, it turned thousands of farmers into poverty. Is such a marketplace possible? And is it desirable?

Read the full post on CGDev for recommended guidelines P4P could use to avoid the pitfalls.

I have maintained in the past that McCain is better for India. And I still maintain that Obama’s economic policies are certainly more irresponsible than McCain’s. The Wall Street Journal - an economically conservative publication - concurs. Yet, the bulk of public opinion is in Obama’s favor. And I am forced to reassess my opposition to a candidate that seems to be all fluff, eloquence, and little substance. Yet, the alternative, as the Economist points out, has been found even more disappointing:

That, however, was Senator McCain; the Candidate McCain of the past six months has too often seemed the victim of political sorcery, his good features magically inverted, his bad ones exaggerated. The fiscal conservative who once tackled Mr Bush over his unaffordable tax cuts now proposes not just to keep the cuts, but to deepen them. The man who denounced the religious right as “agents of intolerance” now embraces theocratic culture warriors. The campaigner against ethanol subsidies (who had a better record on global warming than most Democrats) came out in favour of a petrol-tax holiday. It has not all disappeared: his support for free trade has never wavered. Yet rather than heading towards the centre after he won the nomination, Mr McCain moved to the right.

But Gary Younge of the Guardian carriers a much more emotional argument for Obama.

The day we brought my new-born son home to our Brooklyn apartment, an article in the New York Times pointed out that “a black male who drops out of high school [in the US] is 60 times more likely to find himself in prison than one with a bachelor’s degree”. These are the kind of statistics I often quote in my work. But this time it was personal. Looking down at him as he snoozed in the brand new car seat, I thought: “Those are not great odds. I’d better buy some more children’s books.”

…If there is promise in [in Obama's victory] for my son, it is not so much that he is capable of doing anything he wants - I am his father and it’s my responsibility to teach him that - but that white people won’t necessarily stop him. What that does for his odds of finishing high school or going to jail remains to be seen. In the meantime, I’m off to the bookshop.

If Gary, an Obama cynic too, can claim the symbolism of Obama’s victory to be reason enough for his support - perhaps it is. Perhaps it is more important to get American optimistic again, than it is to maintain a budget surplus. As someone that has lived in America and Europe, I have found the former to be a lot more tolerant, on the surface, of minorities, yet stubbornly resistant to the kind of deep change of attitude that would even the odds for African Americans or Latinos. If Obama can help, that is a good reason for Americans to elect him.

They may still be unpleasantly surprised by what else he and a single party state bring. But the need for self-confidence is a powerful compulsion. The world needs America just as much as America needs the world. As Gary said:

Symbols are too important to be left to the symbol-minded. By that time, my thinking on Obama had evolved. Not so much because of the man, but the moment. The atmosphere during this campaign has been unlike anything I’ve ever seen in a western country. To see so many people - particularly young people - engaged and hopeful about their political future after eight depressing years is inspiring. The last time I saw it was in South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994.

Walking down Sumter Street during Charleston’s Martin Luther King day parade, watching white volunteers chant: “Obama ‘08! We’re ready. Why wait?” gave political voice to an America I never doubted existed, but had yet to see. Among them was a young man who was “so depressed” after Obama’s New Hampshire defeat that he had dropped everything he had been doing in Guatemala and flown back to help out. Local African Americans lined the sidewalks, cheering encouragement. Obama’s victory in Iowa had proved that a black candidacy was not a pipe dream.

It was a moment. Fleeting and maybe even fatuous. But nonetheless a political moment that produced hopeful human engagement. Within half an hour it had evaporated. The white volunteers went back to the office and black people went back to their homes in the poorest parts of town and waited for change. But that didn’t mean it didn’t happen or that it couldn’t happen again. Nor was there anyone else who could make it happen.

So, perhaps it is the moment that will bring Obama victory. Let us hope that Obama will use it well.

Confusing Correlation and Causation

The most disingenous suggestion of Simon Zadek’s post is that ”responsible behavior” is a factor in determining overall national competitiveness. While he would like to “establish new norms of “responsible competitiveness” in global markets,” Zadek believes that this already happens, if you believe what he says about his Responsible Competitiveness Index (or RCI):

The RCI 2007 therefore provides a means of assessing the extent to which responsible business practices are a factor in determining how any particular nation competes in global markets. So, for example, the fact that Brazil scores better than China indicates that the former’s underlying competitive proposition in global markets is driven more than the latter’s, in aggregate, by responsible business practices.

Comparing these results with well-known national competitiveness indexes provides one cross-check of whether the RCI is aligned with conventional measures of national competitiveness. The World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness ranking is the best-known of these measures and seeks to factor in measures of market flexibility, technological development, workforce educational standards, and enabling political environment, among others. The World Bank’s annual Doing Business Index provides a different lens by measuring factors that make business easier, such as the ease of border customs regulations and procedures. There is a relatively close fit between these indexes and the RCI (R2=0.85 for the correlation between the RCI and the World Economic Forum’s Growth Competitiveness Index). This correlation indicates that there is a high correspondence between the level of development of responsible business practices and measured national competitiveness across the hundred or so countries common across the indexes.

This makes a mokery of statistics, but I suspect his confusion of correlation and causation is not unintentional. He states that there is a high correlation between responsible competitiveness (as measured by the RCI), and the overall competitiveness of an economy (as measured by the GCI). This is hardly surprising. But he goes further to say that responsible policies actually cause overall competitiveness to increase:

Today’s experimentation provides concrete evidence that responsible competitiveness strategies are the key to creating tomorrow’s sustainable global economy.

This is so self-serving as to be disappointing. What is more likely - that better CSR increases competitiveness, or that the causation goes the other way? Countries that are highly competitive due to high productivity, extensive use of technology, and low levels of unemployment, can afford to implement more “responsible” requirements.

Ignoring Reality to Sell CSR

Zadek’s oversight is unfortunate, because it undermines his otherwise good argument that markets should reward good behavior. But he is focusing on the wrong kind of behavior:

The need for a more responsible basis on which businesses and economies compete in international markets has never been greater. Global corporations with global strategies contribute to rising inequality and falling economic opportunities for lower-income communities across the developed world.

Bollocks! Global corporations, and their supply chains, have pulled hundreds of millions out of poverty in China and India. And the idea that globalization would unleash a “race to the bottom” has also been disproven. What happens in fact when companies go international is that, while they certainly exploit lax regulation where possible, they bring substantially better employee and consumer practices to target countries. The end result is that they raise the general level of corporate practice.

More generally, a clear argument can be made against the ethical uniformity and imperialism that Zadek promotes. The idea that there is one set of ethical guidelines by which all countries, corporations, and individuals should abide is not only a western conception, it is also highly dangerous. In that case, whose ethics are we to apply? CSR, while good in theory, ends up disenfranchising the people of poorer countries and weakens their institutions - an unintended consequence that few CSR proponents acknowledge, or even mention.

What Zadek desires is certainly a desirable goal and one that was also Adam Smith’s intention. But the kind of CSR that Zadek proposes is what I have previously termed “Advocacy in Home Markets” - it aims to boost the prospects of large multinationals in their home countries, and responds to western criticisms rather than local needs.

If Zadek is serious about building markets that reward responsible behavior, it will require more than fudging numbers. He would do better to focus on the business and less on the ethics, for instance by tracking the performance of companies that address local needs, or integrate green products into their offering, compared to those that do not.

True “responsibility” is not in implementing western standards of regulation. It is in embracing consumers that cannot pay for your service at market rates and accepting the occassional loss (what I call “Strategy in Target Markets”). This is already being done by small and medium enterprises and innovative corporations that engage those SMEs to find business opportunity where earlier there was none. Zadek is misleading us, and the HIR is doing a disservice to its readers, by focusing on the wrong idea.

The sight of hundreds of thousands of muslim protesters saying prayers in public to protest against their government stands in stark contrast to what is happening to another set of Muslims not far from Kashmir. In Xinjiang to the North West the Chinese government severely restricts the practice of Islam.

To be a practicing Muslim in the vast autonomous region of northwestern China called Xinjiang is to live under an intricate series of laws and regulations intended to control the spread and practice of Islam, the predominant religion among the Uighurs, a Turkic people uneasy with Chinese rule.

Two of Islam’s five pillars — the sacred fasting month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca called the hajj — are also carefully controlled. Students and government workers are compelled to eat during Ramadan, and the passports of Uighurs have been confiscated across Xinjiang to force them to join government-run hajj tours rather than travel illegally to Mecca on their own.

The protests in Kashmir destroyed the temporary calm and properity that had returned to the Valley, and created a massive gulf between Jammu and Kashmir. Yet, the Indian government goes forth with its peace agenda. This begs the question - what is it exactly the Muslims in Kashmir want? And are their leaders doing their people any favors?

Let us look at how Kashmiri Muslims have fared compared to Muslims in the region. What are the choices they have?

On the issue of demography it is easy to bring up China and its policies in Tibet. As Kanwal Sibal points out:

China, in Tibet next door, has changed the territory’s demography by settling Hans there in large numbers, reducing the Tibetans to a minority in Lhasa. It is ruthlessly exploiting Tibet’s natural resources, ignoring environmental norms…Its policies are guided essentially by security considerations, to establish an iron grip on the territory and neutralize any challenge to its authority there.

India’s policies have been incomparably more humane than China’s. India could have steadily changed the state’s demography, early after Independence…[or] after 1965 and 1971. India took no decisions with demographic implications even with Pakistan openly abetting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir post-1990 and introducing a new level of challenge to the Indian State. The reverse demographic change brought about by the eviction of the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley has still not been undone.

Let us set the record straight. While China suppresses its minorities, India goes to great lengths to preserve their identities, cultures, and territories. No other country in the world prevents free movement of its own citizens within its borders. India does, in the North East, but particularly in Kashmir.

Kashmiri Muslims also do better socially on the Indian side. The literacy rate in Kashmir was 54.46% in 2001. No comparison can be made with Pakistan Occupied Kashmir because no statistics exist on PoK. But female literacy in Kashmir, at about 45%, was well above the Pakistani average of 35% (and literacy rates are climbing). And the lack of statistics on PoK illustrates Pakistan’s attitude to the region. As Lord Kelvin said, “To measure is to know.” Appearently, Pakistan would rather keep the true state of affairs in Pakistan unknown, than give its people a chance to demand more.

Compare the vitality of NGOs active in Kashmir to protect the (obviously trampled upon) rights of Kashmiris, with the total lack of any opposition in PoK against Pakistan and the contrast is striking. Indian women are currently fighting to reserve 1/3 of all national assembly seats for women; Pakistan is celebrating more women just running for office. Kashmiris go to the polls every few years in relatively free polls - even if they do not like the outcome. When was the last election in PoK?

PoK (or Azad Kashmir) has become South Asia’s Palestine, with parts annexed by Pakistan. Pakistan relegates the residents to a legal limbo that denies them citizenship of either India or Pakistan, merely to prove a point. Meanwhile, India grants its citizens free movement throughout the world.

No doubt, the Indian state has been heavy handed in Kashmir, as elsewhere. Rights have been violated and innocent people shot. It is hard to be objective in such a situation. Yet, it is also clear that not all muslims are equal. India celebrates its authors; Pakistan relegates its to misery even when they win the Nobel prize. Pakistan’s closest ally, China, mistreats its Muslims; Pakistan stays silent. India sends a probe to the moon; Pakistan goes to the IMF for a rescue package.

If judged on fact, most governments can be faulted for something - and India is no exception. But if we measure a State on its intentions, India’s have been overwhelmingly benign. Ultimately, we are all responsible for the choices we make. The Kashmiri separatists protest - but take their right to do so for granted. By doing so they serve themselves and not their people. For those protesting, and those following, these are the choices they are overlooking.

Not surprisingly, coverage of this event is extensive (take a quick look at Google News search), and the foreign press is picking this up as far as Taiwan, Malaysia, Canada, and Australia. Australia’s newspapers said that the launch indicated India’s rise to great power status. In my opinion, however, the broad coverage India’s technical success receives is a better barometer of how important India has become. Clearly, a lot of countries are watching India.

A Space Race…with Significant Differences

Of course, no mention of India’s space ambitions would be complete without comparisons with China’s. For instance, TIME had the following to say:

Asia’s space race just got a whole lot tighter: India’s successful launch on Wednesday of its first moon mission, the unmanned Chandrayaan-I, marked a dramatic step forward in its race with China to put a man on the moon. China had stolen a march in 2003 by becoming only the third nation to fly a man into space (after the U.S. and the old Soviet Union), but when, ten days from now, Chandrayaan-I drops a probe bearing India’s flag onto the moon, India will become only the fourth country to plant its colors on the lunar landscape — after the Americans, the Russians, and Japan.

Yet, there are critical differences in and benefits to India’s approach.

First, it is substantially cheaper than any existing or forthcoming mission: Chandrayaan-1 cost about USD 79 million, while the upcoming Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter from NASA is expected to cost USD 500 million. This emphasis on cost efficiency is a legacy of India’s resource constrained innovation environment, and has been a hallmark of most technical projects. It also gives India a long-term competitive advantage over other nations:

Earlier this year India was ranked by analysts at Futron, a hi-tech consultancy, as only a fraction behind China in global space competitiveness rankings, and well ahead of Japan, Israel and Canada. It is also building a low-cost, hi-tech base. China’s Chang’e I cost nearly double India’s Chandrayaan I bill of $86m.

Second, despite being cheaper, the lunar probe is more technologically advanced than the Chinese and Japanese probes. For the first time, this will allow high-resolution mapping of the moon’s atmosphere and surface.

Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, India’s mission is not a lonely one. Chandrayaan-1 carries two instruments from NASA and one from the Rutherford-Appleton Laboratory in the UK. And India’s next objective - for a larger spacecraft and moon lander - will require collaboration with Russia:

The Indian agency’s next step is to launch a second unmanned lunar mission in 2011, comprising an orbiting spacecraft, a lander and a moon-rover built with Russian help.

Chandrayaan Reflects Politics

Chandrayaan’s rise is a reflection of the geopolitical shift that has taken place in the Western world, towards India. Kissinger once said that “Indians are bastards.” Today, the USA has revoked global non-proliferation rules for India and is paying India to carry its high-tech gagdets into space. This is a sharp rebuke to those that suggested the Indo-US nuclear deal would curtail India’s technological advances, for it illustrates collaboration between India and the world’s current major powers can only benefit us.

Second, it illustrates that India - despite its millions of poor people - has no intention of being left out of the space race, and rightly so. There are many ways to develop a country and address poverty. Investments in innovation, technology, and science are certainly some of the best. Not surprisingly, some prefer that India spend its money to feed the hungry, but they benefit immensely from ISRO’s weather mapping satellites and networks. Dr Kasturirangan, ISRO’s chairperson said it better:

“It is not a question of whether we can afford it. It’s whether we can afford to ignore it…the returns, in terms of the science…the technology, inspiration, stature, prospects for international cooperation… are immense.” For one, it will help India cement its position in the commercial satellite launch sector, and it will give the ISRO valuable experience in building hi-tech spacecraft, improved rocketry and more advanced remote navigation technology — all of which could be put to many uses.

Finally, this mission should give pause to those that question India’s capablities, vis-a-vis China. China may have moved first, but India is not far behind. This mission is cheaper and promises to be more effective. Besides, the words of Bharat Karnad, ironically someone opposed to the nuclear deal and to this mission, are relevant here:

That India is not about to become a “global superpower” in a hurry, is true. But is that reason enough to deny this country the building block capabilities of great power?

In other words, simply because China is ahead of India is no reason not to compete.

There is little doubt that a new “space race” is on. It is also inevitable that this will lead to greater competition in the future. For instance, India and China are both seeking Helium 3 on the moon to source their energy needs. This is just one example of likely competition for limited resources on this “final frontier.” The outcome of this race is far from clear, but India’s approach of avoiding excess and seeking collaboration is better. It bodes well not just for India’s space program, but for the prospects of collaborating to share the spoils.