The sight of hundreds of thousands of muslim protesters saying prayers in public to protest against their government stands in stark contrast to what is happening to another set of Muslims not far from Kashmir. In Xinjiang to the North West the Chinese government severely restricts the practice of Islam.

To be a practicing Muslim in the vast autonomous region of northwestern China called Xinjiang is to live under an intricate series of laws and regulations intended to control the spread and practice of Islam, the predominant religion among the Uighurs, a Turkic people uneasy with Chinese rule.

Two of Islam’s five pillars — the sacred fasting month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca called the hajj — are also carefully controlled. Students and government workers are compelled to eat during Ramadan, and the passports of Uighurs have been confiscated across Xinjiang to force them to join government-run hajj tours rather than travel illegally to Mecca on their own.

The protests in Kashmir destroyed the temporary calm and properity that had returned to the Valley, and created a massive gulf between Jammu and Kashmir. Yet, the Indian government goes forth with its peace agenda. This begs the question - what is it exactly the Muslims in Kashmir want? And are their leaders doing their people any favors?

Let us look at how Kashmiri Muslims have fared compared to Muslims in the region. What are the choices they have?

On the issue of demography it is easy to bring up China and its policies in Tibet. As Kanwal Sibal points out:

China, in Tibet next door, has changed the territory’s demography by settling Hans there in large numbers, reducing the Tibetans to a minority in Lhasa. It is ruthlessly exploiting Tibet’s natural resources, ignoring environmental norms…Its policies are guided essentially by security considerations, to establish an iron grip on the territory and neutralize any challenge to its authority there.

India’s policies have been incomparably more humane than China’s. India could have steadily changed the state’s demography, early after Independence…[or] after 1965 and 1971. India took no decisions with demographic implications even with Pakistan openly abetting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir post-1990 and introducing a new level of challenge to the Indian State. The reverse demographic change brought about by the eviction of the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley has still not been undone.

Let us set the record straight. While China suppresses its minorities, India goes to great lengths to preserve their identities, cultures, and territories. No other country in the world prevents free movement of its own citizens within its borders. India does, in the North East, but particularly in Kashmir.

Kashmiri Muslims also do better socially on the Indian side. The literacy rate in Kashmir was 54.46% in 2001. No comparison can be made with Pakistan Occupied Kashmir because no statistics exist on PoK. But female literacy in Kashmir, at about 45%, was well above the Pakistani average of 35% (and literacy rates are climbing). And the lack of statistics on PoK illustrates Pakistan’s attitude to the region. As Lord Kelvin said, “To measure is to know.” Appearently, Pakistan would rather keep the true state of affairs in Pakistan unknown, than give its people a chance to demand more.

Compare the vitality of NGOs active in Kashmir to protect the (obviously trampled upon) rights of Kashmiris, with the total lack of any opposition in PoK against Pakistan and the contrast is striking. Indian women are currently fighting to reserve 1/3 of all national assembly seats for women; Pakistan is celebrating more women just running for office. Kashmiris go to the polls every few years in relatively free polls - even if they do not like the outcome. When was the last election in PoK?

PoK (or Azad Kashmir) has become South Asia’s Palestine, with parts annexed by Pakistan. Pakistan relegates the residents to a legal limbo that denies them citizenship of either India or Pakistan, merely to prove a point. Meanwhile, India grants its citizens free movement throughout the world.

No doubt, the Indian state has been heavy handed in Kashmir, as elsewhere. Rights have been violated and innocent people shot. It is hard to be objective in such a situation. Yet, it is also clear that not all muslims are equal. India celebrates its authors; Pakistan relegates its to misery even when they win the Nobel prize. Pakistan’s closest ally, China, mistreats its Muslims; Pakistan stays silent. India sends a probe to the moon; Pakistan goes to the IMF for a rescue package.

If judged on fact, most governments can be faulted for something - and India is no exception. But if we measure a State on its intentions, India’s have been overwhelmingly benign. Ultimately, we are all responsible for the choices we make. The Kashmiri separatists protest - but take their right to do so for granted. By doing so they serve themselves and not their people. For those protesting, and those following, these are the choices they are overlooking.

Not surprisingly, coverage of this event is extensive (take a quick look at Google News search), and the foreign press is picking this up as far as Taiwan, Malaysia, Canada, and Australia. Australia’s newspapers said that the launch indicated India’s rise to great power status. In my opinion, however, the broad coverage India’s technical success receives is a better barometer of how important India has become. Clearly, a lot of countries are watching India.

A Space Race…with Significant Differences

Of course, no mention of India’s space ambitions would be complete without comparisons with China’s. For instance, TIME had the following to say:

Asia’s space race just got a whole lot tighter: India’s successful launch on Wednesday of its first moon mission, the unmanned Chandrayaan-I, marked a dramatic step forward in its race with China to put a man on the moon. China had stolen a march in 2003 by becoming only the third nation to fly a man into space (after the U.S. and the old Soviet Union), but when, ten days from now, Chandrayaan-I drops a probe bearing India’s flag onto the moon, India will become only the fourth country to plant its colors on the lunar landscape — after the Americans, the Russians, and Japan.

Yet, there are critical differences in and benefits to India’s approach.

First, it is substantially cheaper than any existing or forthcoming mission: Chandrayaan-1 cost about USD 79 million, while the upcoming Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter from NASA is expected to cost USD 500 million. This emphasis on cost efficiency is a legacy of India’s resource constrained innovation environment, and has been a hallmark of most technical projects. It also gives India a long-term competitive advantage over other nations:

Earlier this year India was ranked by analysts at Futron, a hi-tech consultancy, as only a fraction behind China in global space competitiveness rankings, and well ahead of Japan, Israel and Canada. It is also building a low-cost, hi-tech base. China’s Chang’e I cost nearly double India’s Chandrayaan I bill of $86m.

Second, despite being cheaper, the lunar probe is more technologically advanced than the Chinese and Japanese probes. For the first time, this will allow high-resolution mapping of the moon’s atmosphere and surface.

Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, India’s mission is not a lonely one. Chandrayaan-1 carries two instruments from NASA and one from the Rutherford-Appleton Laboratory in the UK. And India’s next objective - for a larger spacecraft and moon lander - will require collaboration with Russia:

The Indian agency’s next step is to launch a second unmanned lunar mission in 2011, comprising an orbiting spacecraft, a lander and a moon-rover built with Russian help.

Chandrayaan Reflects Politics

Chandrayaan’s rise is a reflection of the geopolitical shift that has taken place in the Western world, towards India. Kissinger once said that “Indians are bastards.” Today, the USA has revoked global non-proliferation rules for India and is paying India to carry its high-tech gagdets into space. This is a sharp rebuke to those that suggested the Indo-US nuclear deal would curtail India’s technological advances, for it illustrates collaboration between India and the world’s current major powers can only benefit us.

Second, it illustrates that India - despite its millions of poor people - has no intention of being left out of the space race, and rightly so. There are many ways to develop a country and address poverty. Investments in innovation, technology, and science are certainly some of the best. Not surprisingly, some prefer that India spend its money to feed the hungry, but they benefit immensely from ISRO’s weather mapping satellites and networks. Dr Kasturirangan, ISRO’s chairperson said it better:

“It is not a question of whether we can afford it. It’s whether we can afford to ignore it…the returns, in terms of the science…the technology, inspiration, stature, prospects for international cooperation… are immense.” For one, it will help India cement its position in the commercial satellite launch sector, and it will give the ISRO valuable experience in building hi-tech spacecraft, improved rocketry and more advanced remote navigation technology — all of which could be put to many uses.

Finally, this mission should give pause to those that question India’s capablities, vis-a-vis China. China may have moved first, but India is not far behind. This mission is cheaper and promises to be more effective. Besides, the words of Bharat Karnad, ironically someone opposed to the nuclear deal and to this mission, are relevant here:

That India is not about to become a “global superpower” in a hurry, is true. But is that reason enough to deny this country the building block capabilities of great power?

In other words, simply because China is ahead of India is no reason not to compete.

There is little doubt that a new “space race” is on. It is also inevitable that this will lead to greater competition in the future. For instance, India and China are both seeking Helium 3 on the moon to source their energy needs. This is just one example of likely competition for limited resources on this “final frontier.” The outcome of this race is far from clear, but India’s approach of avoiding excess and seeking collaboration is better. It bodes well not just for India’s space program, but for the prospects of collaborating to share the spoils.

TIME magazine explains the true significance:

The significance of the deal, known as the 123 Agreement, cannot be overestimated. In addition to reversing 34 years of U.S. policy opposing nuclear cooperation with India — a nuclear weapons state that continues to refuse to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — the deal wins acceptance for India’s de facto nuclear weapons state status at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the international cartel that controls trade in nuclear weapons, fuel and technology.

India can now celebrate. Not only do we get access to technology previously denied, but we keep our nuclear weapons. Besides, this is an unprecedented opportunity to build even closer ties with the world’s sole remaining superpower. As Senator Kerry argues, the true benefit of the deal emerges if “U.S.-India relations must be about more than exchanging nuclear fuel or technology.”

Indians, however, should be mourning. Because even as the country can benefit, the deal’s passage reveals the complete failure of our politicians to act in concert.

Upon the deal’s passage Prakash Karat of the CPM opined, “it will be a complete surrender to the US and a betrayal of India’s vital interests.” A complete surrender to the US? Mr. Karat should be asked how it is then that so many Americans consider the deal to be against America’s vital interests? Surely, it cannot be against the interests of both countries? And the communists should not invoke India’s vital interests, given their history of fomenting revolution in post-independence India and the CPM’s roots in the Naxalite movement.

At the other end of the political spectrum the BJP opposes the deal too, saying, ”We have acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation regime with the India-US nuclear deal.” And that, Mr. Ravi Pratap, is a good thing. Because we have acceded to the regime as a nuclear weapons state. The question to be posed to him is - so why not accede to it?

Both the Left and the BJP’s actual concern - that the deal restricts India’s ability to conduct nuclear tests - is no criticism at all. Because the deal’s restrictions only take away what India never had, they are not a valid reason to oppose the deal. Yet, the BJP continues to say that “it is a time to worry but the Congress bosses are tom-tomming their sense of pseudo achievement.”

What is worrying is not the deal - the BJP no doubt would have been “tom-tomming” too, if it had been in power. What we should worry about is the inability of our politicians to put aside their petty differences on a deal that is so obviously in our favor. If they cannot do so on an issue that has almost no domestic implications - and thus no real impact on elections - can we really hope for progress on critical things like labor reform, education, and healthcare?

It is sad that when such an opportunity presents itself Indians can count on the help of foreign Presidents, but not on their own politicians across the aisle. We may have surrendered some pride and sovereignty - but the blame for that must go to the BJP and the CPM.

The deal benefits both India and the US. Non-proliferation may be somewhat weaker. But the real looser is the Indian electorate.

The author, Swagato Ganguly, provides one major argument in support of his assertion: that McCain, whose hero is Ronald Reagan, would offer a dangerous continuation of Bush’s neoconservatism. In this view, “an Obama administration would be preferable to the heavy-breathing belligerence of a John McCain.”

Yet, this argument is flawed. First, it equates McCain’s policies to Bush’s. Yet, while Bush’s first term did project neoconservative thought into American foreign policy, in recent years his actions have been tempered by the limits of unilateral action. Today, almost every major international initiative - on North Korea, Iran, or the Middle East - involves other countries.

Second, McCain might hold Reagan in high regard but Reagan was a realist, not a neocon. It is unclear if McCain is either, as he is being courted by both the liberal and conservative movements of the Republican party. But, if anything, the return of realism to international politics would be a welcome change, adding a level of predictability that has been missing for the last several years.

The biggest mistake of the article, however, is to equate the interests of the world with those of India. Yes, an administration more committed to multilateralism might be better for the world order - but not for an India that explicitly seeks to change that world order.

Yes, McCain might be more inclined to attack Iran. By the same measure, he would also be more inclined to pressure Pakistan to act on terror by providing a stick as well as a carrot. On the economy, Republican presidents have historically been far more supportive of higher work permit quotas for Indian workers, and push more for free trade.

McCain’s preference for unilateralism would also work in India’s favor. Regardless of whether one is in favor of the Indo-US nuclear deal, one must admit that Obama would never change global rules as Bush did for the Indo-US nuclear deal. And while the League of Democracies proposed by McCain might bypass the UN to validate military action, it would certainly place India at the head table - something India cannot hope for at the UN Security Council.

History shows that Republican presidents have been more beneficial for India. Jimmy Carter vehemently opposses the Indo-US nuclear deal and wants to treat India and Pakistan equally; Bill Clinton applied sanctions to India in 1998. Kissinger, in contrast, might have called Indira Gandhi a “bitch,” but he was also a pragmatist and has supported India’s rise, saying as early as 1998 that “major sanctions are probably a mistake.”

Editorials are, of course, meant to express opinions. But it is disappointing that the Times of India carries opinions so biased as to have no link to objectivity. A preference for Obama is based on a worldview of a multilateral world in which several equal powers work cooperatively. Yet, that is not the reality yet. Till that happens, India will benefit more from a relationship with the US “dehyphenated” from Pakistan, predictability in the world order, the ability to create new rules, and a US administration committed to economic liberalism. Contrary to Swagato’s opinion, Obama is unlikely to offer any of this.

Nuclear deterrence has come full circle. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), established in 1964 in response to the first nuclear tests by India, recently approved a waiver for nuclear trade with India. Regardless of whether the US Congress finally backs the 123 Agreement, India is now very much within the nuclear mainstream and expects to quickly expand nuclear power generation capacity. According to critics, however, this also allows India to expand its nuclear weapons program (a comprehensive discussion of the deal’s criticisms was previously posted).

Yet, the possession of nuclear weapons is not a sufficient condition for deterrence in South Asia. Indeed, as previously discussed, mutually assured destruction will not lead to stability here as it did between the US and USSR.This presents a quandary for the international community. Avoiding the prospect of nuclear war requires engagement. Yet, engaging India and Pakistan on their nuclear weapons risks legitimizing those weapons. How are countries to respond?

Pragmatism suggests the international community can engage in three areas to mitigate the unique problems of nuclear deterrence in the subcontinent, without crossing the threshold of legitimizing nuclear weapons.

Asserting Civilian Command and Control
Part of the problem of nuclear instability stems from the role of the military in Pakistan, severe limitations in the command, control and intelligence structures of both countries, and technical deficiencies in the handling of nuclear weapons. These problems could lead to non-conventional confrontation in South Asia.

One of the most difficult tasks, therefore, is to reduce the likelihood of military biases in Pakistan leading to preventive or unintended nuclear war through the implementation of sustained civil control over the men in uniform. It is unclear if the military is willing to give up its current influence, but with the impetus of a new government and a political compulsion to fighting terror that is increasingly domestic, the international community could begin a process of negotiations to separate the military from nuclear weapons control.

Simultaneously, both countries can also benefit from stronger command and control structures. The likelihood of unintended war can be mitigated by sharing with India and Pakistan the know-how that the two former cold war opponents developed to avoid mismanagement that could lead to a nuclear confrontation.

Improving Weapons Safety
Equally primordial to the international community should be to provide technical assistance in the development of a safer and more secure nuclear arsenal in both India and Pakistan. The key point here is to improve weapons safety and security, without enhancing their readiness. To this end the five ‘legal’ nuclear powers could share information on electronic locking devices, weapons safety design improvements and personal reliability programs and offer assistance in the implementation of a physical security system to protect nuclear weapons storage sites.

Increasing Transparency and Predictability
Third, the international community should persuade India and Pakistan to follow certain ‘healthy’ ways of nuclear behavior: each side must accept that military victory over the other is not possible; neither country must use the fear of non-conventional war to attempt to change the political and territorial status quo; and both states should avoid initiating or escalating bilateral crises, particularly those that have the potential to escalate to military and eventually to nuclear confrontations.

One initiative that could contribute to stability would be an agreement to station observers in the other state, a move that would provide a level of transparency regarding the nuclear armaments of both India and Pakistan, eliminating the opacity factor and its dangerous consequences. The international community could strengthen such an effort by providing technical assistance to establish modern and reliable channels of communication between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Conclusion: Building Lasting Peace
These short-term measures can be just that - short-term. They cannot be seen as legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, it should be clear to both Indian and Pakistani authorities that they are only instruments conceived to correct the short-term deficiencies of their nuclear policies. This is not merely a matter of principle. By institutionalizing the possession of nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of conflict, these measures could undermine the prospects of long-term arms control.

Therefore, these measures cannot be treated independent of the ultimate aim of an arms control regime strong enough to impede the fabrication and testing of new non-conventional armament (even if it does not seek their total elimination).

As a first step, both countries could be encouraged to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), constraining the development of new weapons. Correctly applied, this instrument may also aid the long process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The international community should also expend efforts towards halting India and Pakistan’s production of weapons grade fissile material, while drafting a treaty for the cut-off of fissile material. Finally, it is also advisable to encourage the limitation of the development and deployment of nuclear capable missiles and aircraft in both South Asian countries, and propose other measures of strategic restraint.

In the short term these three recommendations could help in the establishment of a more stable nuclear deterrence system in South Asia. In the long term, some of them could also serve to facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament. Many of these measures involve complicated negotiations and may be very difficult to implement. However, if at least one of them is concretized the security in the subcontinent will have improved remarkably, reducing the risks of a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. And, principles of non-proliferation notwithstanding, no energy should be spared towards the achievement of such a goal.

Today, almost 17 years after the Cold War there is another conflict that presents some of the characteristics of the superpowers’ confrontation: the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Since 1947 these two nations have frequently collided and been in a near state of war for extended periods of time, each of them dubious about the territorial ambitions of its neighbor.

After their independence, India and Pakistan were involved in a series of conventional wars. But in the last twenty-five years, and contrary to the mandates of international law, these South Asian countries have acquired nuclear weapons, changing completely the regional strategic scenario. Yet, the nuclear factor has been used by some scholars and experts to explain the absence of major recent confrontations between these two neighbors.

Can the same precepts of nuclear deterrence theory, used for the Cold War, be applied to this conflict? Or are there some peculiarities that make strategic deterrence inapplicable in South Asia?

These are questions that I will try to answer. I will concentrate, particularly, on four aspects of the South Asia context: the level of institutionalization of control over nuclear weapons, the technological capabilities of both countries to handle non-conventional weapons, the lack of transparency they have shown regarding their nuclear arsenals, and the presence of non-state actors.

Level of institutional control
During the cold war, both the Soviet Union and the United States built a complex management system to ensure appropriate control over their nuclear weapons. In both cases the heads of state of both nations had ultimate say about their use.

This does not seem to be the case in South Asia. Neither Islamabad nor New Delhi has managed to establish and demonstrate a reliable communications system that can guarantee the functioning of the regular chain of command. Not only is this problematic in and of itself, but by suggesting lack of control it breeds miscalculation of adversary actions or intentions and may lead to unnecessarily hasty decision-making.

Another aspect that must be considered is the role of the military in each country. In the South Asian dispute the military, mainly on the Pakistani side, has demonstrated that it has a major say on the use of non-conventional weapons. Voices in the military branch have made it clear that they will retain the option to use nuclear weapons as a response to a conventional Indian attack.

Level of technological control
During the Cold War, concomitant to the development of non-conventional weapons the superpowers created sophisticated technological mechanisms to prevent accidents that could have triggered a nuclear response.

The dangers of nuclear weapon accidents and even accidental war are very high when armaments lack safe design features and are inappropriately assembled. Moreover, when there is interplay of mutual expectations about a possible surprise attack and a lack of early-warning systems, the adoption of aggressive positions may be forced, creating a vicious cycle that ends in precipitous overreactions.

Neither Pakistan nor India possess accurate intelligence or warning systems. Therefore the possibility of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, by accident, cannot be ruled out. Their weak control systems and the relative inexperience in managing nuclear weapons make it possible to cross a ‘line in the sand’ unintentionally.

The Opacity Factor
In the period corresponding from 1950 to 1991 the superpowers constantly publicized the number of nuclear weapons they possessed. Moreover, they were very specific about the characteristics of these armaments. The main reason for this transparency was to make the rival aware of the capacity of executing a second strike in case of a preemptive nuclear attack. This is considered to be one of the basic elements of nuclear deterrence strategy.

In the South Asian crisis a different phenomenon is evident. In this case the actors have not developed an open policy regarding their nuclear arsenals. In fact, the posture of India and Pakistan is one of opacity: there is constant uncertainty regarding the number of nuclear weapons they possess, their location and readiness for use, and the plans that have been made for their delivery.

Uncertainty regarding the size, location and readiness of an opponent’s nuclear force could induce caution. But it can also lead a nation to underestimate an opponent’s will or ability to respond, emboldening it to escalate a crisis or to preempt.

The presence of non-state actors
In Cold War nuclear deterrence there were basically two well-identified actors, which made strategic planning for both countries easier. However, in South Asia - but particularly in Pakistan - there are fundamentalist organizations that see the initiation of a nuclear confrontation in the region, as being in their own interest. These organizations operate independently, outside the influence of the government.

Islamic movements acting in Pakistan could seek to destabilize the region, carrying out a terrorist attack of such magnitude that New Delhi would be obliged to retaliate with nuclear weapons. These fundamentalist groups would profit from a war with India that led to the destruction of an independent Pakistan, for non-state actors have better chances to be successful only in failed, collapsed and war-torn states.

Conclusion
The Cold War was a conflict with peculiar characteristics in which the actors developed very clear ways of behavior regarding their nuclear strategies. The South Asian conflict, however, presents different features and its actors are not following the same nuclear policies elaborated during most of the second half of the twentieth century. The institutional and technological aspects of this standoff increases the risk of nuclear interchange in the region. Moreover, factors such as the presence of non-state actors with interests in the conflict also conspire against a peaceful coexistence. Too many factors indicate that nuclear deterrence may not work in the region, and the next confrontation between these two states could be a nuclear one.

What are the options? Assuming that nobody wants a nuclear conflict, how can the international community move both countries to a safer status quo - should the international community encourage both countries towards nuclear disarmament; is that even a realistic option?

This is part one of a two part series. Part two will analyze the prospects for nuclear disarmament and other options for a safer South Asia

It is worth mentioning that some of the comments came from a very unlikely source - the E.G. West Centre at the University of Newcastle. For those unaware, the Centre is led by Prof. James Tooley who has done by far the most work on privatization of education, and is currently also President of the Education Fund at Orient Global. I have a lot of respect for his work in the trenches of urban poverty. So it is disappointing that some comments initially led me to believe that even questioning his hypothesis was seen by the Centre as a personal affront. In followup email communication though Dr. B. M. Craven was kind enough to provide substantial references in support of his argument. I will look at each of these to see if they address or counter the issues previously presented and provide them here as a possible rebuttal to my article (you decide).

• Video links on the E.G.West website. In particular, the following seem relevant
  • New Schools of Thought in Africa (2007)
  • Educational Self Help in India (2002)
  • Does Private Education work for the Poor (2005)
• Private Education is Good for the Poor: A Study of Private Schools Serving the Poor in Low-Income Countries (Cato Institute paper)

Simultaneously, Dr. Craven also said he would “be glad to read any research which supports your thesis which you can recommend.”

While some data was presented in the last post, it is true that there has been little research that makes a case for public education. Of course, these days proposing any role for the State is fraught with risk but I’d still like to throw down the gauntlet to the readers.

Can you refer to any empirical studies that look at the benefits of education in a public setting and/or the failings of a private school system?

In view of such overwhelming “evidence,” what, after all, is the evidence in favor of public schools?

Yet, the evidence is very much there. After all, China far outperforms India on educational indicators such as enrolment and efficiency, despite having a largely public primary system. Clearly, you don’t need a private system to achieve high quality and provide universal access to education.

Closer to home, Abi at Nanopolitan shows how publicly funded Kendriya Vidyalaya schools outperform even private schools at the CBSE exams. In 2007, KV schools (of which there were 860), had a pass percentage of 95.6%. Jawahar Navodayas, had a pass percentage of 96.4%, private schools had 91.8%, and other government schools had 70.3%. Clearly, not all public schools are the same!

Another important point emerging from this post is the massive performance improvement that Delhi’s government schools displayed last year. The pass percentage of this group of schools improved from 59.73% to 77.12%. The key was offering the right carrots and sticks, as illustrated in the article. Clearly, then, improving quality is not a question of public or private, but of offering the right incentives - regardless of the system.

A third bit of evidence emerges, ironicaly, from Tooley’s study itself. A Dr. B.M. Craven writes in a comment that in Tooley’s study, “facilities such as toilets, playgrounds, desks, blackboards and computers were inferior in the private schools by comparison with the Government schools but such measures (inputs) do not appear to have affected outcomes.” Tooley’s summary also states that private unaided schools had “sometimes better facilities than government schools.” Yet, why are we settling for worse facilities, so long as they do not affect outcomes?

Such infrastructure is important not simply for outcomes, but in and of itself (would you prefer to send your child to a school without toilets, or one with?). It also has an important impact on limiting access and school choice (as pointed out previously, girls will be excluded in this system). Finally, it clearly points to the underlying problem of private schools - that they have no incentive to invest in anything that does not directly appear to improve quality - and will therefore not invest to correct existing inequities (through e.g. greater investment in infrastructure, outreach, etc.).

It is a sign of our times that we take all things publicly funded to be of poor quality, despite evidence to the contrary. While government is, in general, not known for service excellence, there is enough data out there showing that public schools can be very good (i.e. private schools are not necessary), and conversely, that private schools have substantial problems of their own (i.e. private schools are not sufficient to solve our problems).

As Martin Carnoy wrote: “I would like to believe, with Professor West, in a panacea that could make everyone learn more without investing enormous time and effort in improving children’s nutrition, home lives, and the way all schools deliver knowledge…Unfortunately, vouchers tend to divert attention from the overall complexity of the learning problem rather than providing a real solution.”

These problems persist despite several initiatives by the Central government to improve outcomes. Increasingly, therefore, liberal economists, international development agencies, and philanthropies have called for a shift towards greater privatization of primary and higher education. In particular, calls emerge to disconnect the funding of education from its operation, through the provision of education vouchers.

Privatization has worked well in several situations in India. Yet as the belief that it works everywhere gains greater currency, there is a need to evaluate if education is also amenable to privatization.

The Basic Argument

The idea of private education vouchers was first put forth by Prof. Edwin G. West. More recently, high profile organizations such as the World Bank and the Orient Global Foundation (with committed funding of US$100 million) have given the idea new impetus.

The theory is simple – deregulate education and allow private operation of schools, giving parents the option to choose where they wish to send children (so called “school choice”). The resulting competition amongst schools for these “consumers” would lead them to improve quality and expand access. The obvious challenge of including poor students is solved by providing poor parents with vouchers funded by the government.

Voucher systems have been tested in several countries - developing and developed - and arguments exist for and against. But few have tested the underlying assumptions of the theory of privatization.

Testing the Assumptions

The success of a largely private system depends fundamentally on two things – a financial incentive and the natural competition of free-markets. The assumption of competition in turn assumes three things: a) that “school choice” is real, b) that it is not possible to cheat the system, and c) that information flows are reliable enough to evaluate quality.

Do these assumptions hold?

The fallacy of school choice: In a private system quality improves through competition. Yet, experience shows that true competition is unlikely here. This is first, and foremost, a matter of supply and demand. Demand for education vastly outstrips supply in India and will do so for the foreseeable future. This remains true in the most affluent areas of Delhi, where it is common for parents to apply to several schools to secure admission for their children. Further, the cost of switching schools is high, marked by a social cost to the child of readjusting to a new environment and the administrative/financial cost to parents of the process. Finally, and as pointed out by Charles Wheelan, schools tend to restrict supply simply to maintain quality. Consumer power, then, is so limited as to make “school choice” more of an illusion even in the most “privatization friendly” situations. And if it doesn’t work here what hope do parents in small, remote, poor villages have where exclusion is largely social and thus not corrected by vouchers?

The problem of cheating: The second assumption is that faced with strong incentives schools will improve actual outcomes rather than cheat the system. It is illustrative, here, to note that in response to the No Child Left Behind act, public schools in Chicago were found cheating on grades (they also underreported violence). That these were public schools is irrelevant – what is important is that faced with a top-down incentive to improve quality, schools preferred to cheat the system rather than make the necessary investments to improve actual quality.

Poor information for poorer consumers: This brings forth a final problem - that of evaluating quality. The education “market” is marked by poor information flows and by an inability of a large number of parents, who never went to school themselves, to evaluate objectively what a good school is. This again undermines the assumption that “school choice” exists. The truth is that we simply do not have a single definition of quality. Therefore, it is equally possible that schools that invest more in marketing and outreach - rather than in improving quality - will gain the most.

Unintended Consequences

There is one final test to which a private system must be put – even if private education were to improve quality, would it improve access and existing inequities in provision - or at least not make them worse? The two points cannot, of course, be delinked because any school’s outcome depends largely on the students it admits. Therefore, schools that receive students from academically poorer backgrounds must invest more to achieve the same outcomes. As Charles Wheelan said:

I expect that the Chicago Public Schools would be excellent if they had to accept only 1 of every 10 eligible students. (Indeed, the magnet schools in the system, which are allowed to select students competitively, are some of the best in the country.)

Second, education is often denied to children for a variety of causes and money or the absence of schools are only two of them. Others include the lack of roads, the lack of separate toilets for girls and boys (which prevents parents from sending girls), and the lack of “cultural capital” – such as supportive parents – which provides a select group of students with the skills to gain admission while depriving others of the same.

Can a largely private system ensure that schools help students overcome these barriers? Alternately, as education becomes a commodity, provided to the highest bidder, can its ill-effects be suppressed by ensuring necessary investments are made – such as arranging buses, building toilets, or helping disadvantaged students overcome their skills deficit through corrective courses? The obvious solution, of course, is oversight through regulation. Yet, to paraphrase economist Joan Robinson, “any State that has the capacity to prevent the ill-effects of the commoditization of education can also prevent the commoditization of education altogether; and any State that cannot prevent the commoditization of education lacks, ipso facto, the capacity to prevent its ill-effects.”

Is Privatization Necessary?

The preceding suggests that a private system is not a sufficient condition to better quality and access. Is it, however, a necessary condition? Or, is there another way of solving the problem through a public system?

There is no better argument that the same results are possible from a public system than China. As this comparison shows, China has done better than India both in providing quality and access to primary education, yet done so through a largely public system. Recent moves to privatize and deregulate education have been largely limited to higher education, with universities being encouraged to raise their own funds and endowments.

Clearly, then, privatization is not the only game in town. Nor is there any reason to believe that private schools are always preferred. For instance, a recent study in slums found that the vast majority of parents sent their children to “budget” private schools. This does not indicate a preference for private schools, but rather a lack of sufficient and good public schools. Moreover, very often in cases where both are present, private schools may be preferred not because of actual quality differences, but because of a social preference for private providers (seen as status symbols), or due to perceived rather than actual quality differences (bringing us back to the problem of defining quality).

Taking The Best of Privatization

It bears mentioning that despite its limitations, privatization does offer insight into the core problem – that public systems in India currently lack any compelling incentive to provide good education. The question should therefore be, how can incentives be built into public and private systems that ensure greater access and better quality without the negative consequences of a fully private system.

Clearly, this is possible. The American No Child Left Behind Act, despite its problems, is one example. In recent years, Delhi too has improved elementary education, largely by providing the right carrots and sticks to schools and teachers. Finally, one must also consider that the majority of government schools in India are poorly funded and managed. Simple measures such as a better working environment for teachers and basic infrastructure that indicate respect for their work would go far to provide non-financial incentives for improving quality. Indeed, without such changes comparing public and private schools is comparing apples to oranges.

Conclusion

The argument for privatization is at once political and ideological. It is political because it reflects how societies feel about the role of the state in providing “public” services such as healthcare and education. It is ideological because proponents often supplement demands for privatization with terms such as “economic freedom” or “choice” to justify their preference. Yet, this last confuses means with ends. The existence of choice can hardly be viewed as an end in itself in this discussion. Not only does such terminology presume that choice is informed but it is relevant in this debate only if it improves actual educational outcomes, rather than the perceived satisfaction of parents.

It would appear that privatization is neither necessary nor sufficient for better quality and access to education. Nor is money the only or even best incentive available to improve either. Yet, the debate does offer valuable insights into why our system has not worked and how to fix it. The current system can, therefore, gain much through greater competition (possibly internal) and better incentives (possibly non-financial).

Finally, this debate must recognize that quality is interlinked with access and equity. The two require clear tradeoffs – high quality can generally only come by selecting the best and conversely by denying access to the most needy. Therefore, no debate on privatization can occur without debating the balance between quality and equity that India wishes to achieve. It is as much a debate on what India’s system should be like, as it is a debate on what our national priorities are to be –to be a thoroughbred meritocracy or to offer equality of opportunity to the majority of our people.

Note: Throughout this text I have used the American English term “public school” to imply a “government school” (the British/Indian English equivalent).

Discussions on this issue generally take either an ethical or an economic perspective, with very few considering the politics of climate change negotiations. Yet, that perspective is particularly important for India, because the costs of climate change are so high for it.

By some measures India has the most to loose from climate change. This is not surprising given the country’s vast rural population, overwhelmingly dependent on natural weather patterns. Intuitively, India should therefore not only be acting forcefully to help its population adapt, it should be encouraging all developed economies to tackle climate change convincingly. Yet, India has resisted calls for binding emission cuts that would spur other countries to follow and has also avoided taking a lead role in negotiations on the issue.

Such resistance can perhaps be explained by the fact that western policymakers have seldom acknowledged the vulnerability of the developing world. Nor have their policy proposals, including Kyoto, included substantive provisions for helping vulnerable countries adapt. In the absence of assistance on adaptation, India has little incentive to participate in global mitigation efforts. Instead, India’s approach reflects the advice of economist Thomas Schelling that given their limited ability to adapt, “the best way for developing countries to mitigate global warming is through economic growth.”

We are presented, therefore, with a dilemma. In the long run, India would benefit from a collective response to global warming. But in the short term and with no agreement on a post-Kyoto framework, a unilateral strategy of high emissions growth would be more beneficial. Both parties in this situation would benefit from cooperating, but cooperation is hindered both by trust and the asymmetrical cost of cooperation.

The Case for Engagement

Such cooperation could be pursued for two reasons. The first is merely existential – anything that triggers a collective mitigation response from the developed world helps India. But a more compelling argument is political – by not participating in negotiations India risks the creation of a framework that does not reflect its concerns (see Why India Must Act).

There are unmistakable signs that this will happen, particularly with American business lobbying for a “global framework” that prevents balkanization of regulation, reduces operational uncertainty and prevents dilution of their competitive advantages. Last year the American Congress proposed legislation to tax imports from countries that do not restrict carbon emissions. Early this year, the European Commission too announced it was considering import taxes for carbon-heavy imports, triggering the prospects of a trade war with China and India.

There are useful parallels here to study from the incorporation in 1995, of the TRIPS agreement. The TRIPS Agreement came into being when the US, Europe, Japan, and Canada (known then as “the Quad”) decided to create a new international framework encompassing intellectual property. Rather than attempt to modify the GATT, they instead created the World Trade Organization, and forced developing countries to accept the TRIPS agreement, along with two others. Since developing countries did not participate in negotiations, their concerns were not reflected therein – a bias that has not been adequately corrected since despite the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and the currently stalled Doha “development” round. The lesson is simple – it is better to establish a favorable international policy, rather than try to change such a policy after the fact.

The Case for Disengagement

If the case for engagement is strong, the case for waiting for action by others is even stronger, though less obvious. Arguments for not participating in negotiations lie in the dynamics of bargaining power – and how participation in negotiations affects that power.

Agreement in international negotiations occurs not because there is an economic or ethical case for it. Rather, it is based on quid pro quo. Countries that loose from the agreement join a treaty when they are appropriately compensated by those that gain.

So, who looses and who gains from climate change?

The economic models of Nordhaus & Boyer estimate the economic cost of global warming will be highest for India, Africa, and Europe. In comparison, Russia will receive a mild boost to its GDP, while the impact on America and China is expected to be relatively low. This explains why Europe and Africa are enthusiastic for a collective response. It also explains why America did not join Kyoto – because the treaty did not compensate it sufficiently for the economic costs of carbon mitigation.

This suggests it may be smart for India not to participate in ongoing negotiations just yet. As a country that looses from climate change and benefits directly from a collective response to it, India’s case for any compensation is weak. India’s bargaining power derives not from its ability for give-and-take, but rather from the world’s desire to include it in a future treaty. The moment India indicates a desire to participate in those negotiations it weakens its own bargaining power.

A Middle Path: Free Riding on China

How then is India to proceed? One option, perhaps, may be to free ride on China’s negotiations with the US. China is the counter-point to the US within the developing world – it looses little from climate change, yet its involvement is essential to the success of any future treaty. Therefore, China is much better positioned to bargain for compensation (e.g. technology transfer, R&D financing, or adaptation assistance), and should therefore be at the vanguard of negotiating a climate treaty with the US and EU.

There is still much India can do, as it reiterates the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility.” For instance, India needs to lead efforts to reframe the issue of climate change as one of adaptation, not mitigation (which is a Euro-centric view). It also should work closely with major emerging economies to define a collective bargaining position for the developing world in return for participation in a climate change treaty. Not only would such bargaining improve the potential outcome in favor of the developing world, it would also support and reflect India’s political rise and ability to convene.

Conclusion

A climate change treaty that binds India to mitigating action is no longer an option but a virtual certainty. Such a treaty will become fact either through negotiation or through unilateral measures by the developed world. To avoid lockout, India must have a strategy for addressing such negotiations.

Current disagreement between India on the one hand and Europe and the US on the other is unlikely to be resolved till a new treaty addresses the dilemma faced by India. That will essentially involve payments from winners of the agreement, to the loosers. Some of the elements of such a payment system are already in place, such as Kyoto’s Adaptation Fund, but they must be substantially expanded. Domestically, India should continue to cherry-pick and implement initiatives that are domestically economically viable to reduce emissions growth. But at the international level, India’s best strategy for negotiations may simply to promote China as a collective bargainer and signal its own resistance to bargaining – a signal which up to a point will strengthen India’s position.