Today, almost 17 years after the Cold War there is another conflict that presents some of the characteristics of the superpowers’ confrontation: the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Since 1947 these two nations have frequently collided and been in a near state of war for extended periods of time, each of them dubious about the territorial ambitions of its neighbor.

After their independence, India and Pakistan were involved in a series of conventional wars. But in the last twenty-five years, and contrary to the mandates of international law, these South Asian countries have acquired nuclear weapons, changing completely the regional strategic scenario. Yet, the nuclear factor has been used by some scholars and experts to explain the absence of major recent confrontations between these two neighbors.

Can the same precepts of nuclear deterrence theory, used for the Cold War, be applied to this conflict? Or are there some peculiarities that make strategic deterrence inapplicable in South Asia?

These are questions that I will try to answer. I will concentrate, particularly, on four aspects of the South Asia context: the level of institutionalization of control over nuclear weapons, the technological capabilities of both countries to handle non-conventional weapons, the lack of transparency they have shown regarding their nuclear arsenals, and the presence of non-state actors.

Level of institutional control
During the cold war, both the Soviet Union and the United States built a complex management system to ensure appropriate control over their nuclear weapons. In both cases the heads of state of both nations had ultimate say about their use.

This does not seem to be the case in South Asia. Neither Islamabad nor New Delhi has managed to establish and demonstrate a reliable communications system that can guarantee the functioning of the regular chain of command. Not only is this problematic in and of itself, but by suggesting lack of control it breeds miscalculation of adversary actions or intentions and may lead to unnecessarily hasty decision-making.

Another aspect that must be considered is the role of the military in each country. In the South Asian dispute the military, mainly on the Pakistani side, has demonstrated that it has a major say on the use of non-conventional weapons. Voices in the military branch have made it clear that they will retain the option to use nuclear weapons as a response to a conventional Indian attack.

Level of technological control
During the Cold War, concomitant to the development of non-conventional weapons the superpowers created sophisticated technological mechanisms to prevent accidents that could have triggered a nuclear response.

The dangers of nuclear weapon accidents and even accidental war are very high when armaments lack safe design features and are inappropriately assembled. Moreover, when there is interplay of mutual expectations about a possible surprise attack and a lack of early-warning systems, the adoption of aggressive positions may be forced, creating a vicious cycle that ends in precipitous overreactions.

Neither Pakistan nor India possess accurate intelligence or warning systems. Therefore the possibility of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, by accident, cannot be ruled out. Their weak control systems and the relative inexperience in managing nuclear weapons make it possible to cross a ‘line in the sand’ unintentionally.

The Opacity Factor
In the period corresponding from 1950 to 1991 the superpowers constantly publicized the number of nuclear weapons they possessed. Moreover, they were very specific about the characteristics of these armaments. The main reason for this transparency was to make the rival aware of the capacity of executing a second strike in case of a preemptive nuclear attack. This is considered to be one of the basic elements of nuclear deterrence strategy.

In the South Asian crisis a different phenomenon is evident. In this case the actors have not developed an open policy regarding their nuclear arsenals. In fact, the posture of India and Pakistan is one of opacity: there is constant uncertainty regarding the number of nuclear weapons they possess, their location and readiness for use, and the plans that have been made for their delivery.

Uncertainty regarding the size, location and readiness of an opponent’s nuclear force could induce caution. But it can also lead a nation to underestimate an opponent’s will or ability to respond, emboldening it to escalate a crisis or to preempt.

The presence of non-state actors
In Cold War nuclear deterrence there were basically two well-identified actors, which made strategic planning for both countries easier. However, in South Asia - but particularly in Pakistan - there are fundamentalist organizations that see the initiation of a nuclear confrontation in the region, as being in their own interest. These organizations operate independently, outside the influence of the government.

Islamic movements acting in Pakistan could seek to destabilize the region, carrying out a terrorist attack of such magnitude that New Delhi would be obliged to retaliate with nuclear weapons. These fundamentalist groups would profit from a war with India that led to the destruction of an independent Pakistan, for non-state actors have better chances to be successful only in failed, collapsed and war-torn states.

Conclusion
The Cold War was a conflict with peculiar characteristics in which the actors developed very clear ways of behavior regarding their nuclear strategies. The South Asian conflict, however, presents different features and its actors are not following the same nuclear policies elaborated during most of the second half of the twentieth century. The institutional and technological aspects of this standoff increases the risk of nuclear interchange in the region. Moreover, factors such as the presence of non-state actors with interests in the conflict also conspire against a peaceful coexistence. Too many factors indicate that nuclear deterrence may not work in the region, and the next confrontation between these two states could be a nuclear one.

What are the options? Assuming that nobody wants a nuclear conflict, how can the international community move both countries to a safer status quo - should the international community encourage both countries towards nuclear disarmament; is that even a realistic option?

This is part one of a two part series. Part two will analyze the prospects for nuclear disarmament and other options for a safer South Asia

For the moment it is clear that reform will not come from the top. Raul Castro himself declared that there will be no changes in the communist structures governing the island since 1961, and that no political transition will take place. This was reinforced by the election of 77-year old revolutionary leader Jose Ramon Machado to the No. 2 spot - an assurance to the old guard that no new and sudden changes are likely. This is hardly surprising - it is difficult to imagine the gerontocracy that governs Cuba willingly giving up power soon.

However, the key question is not whether internal political transition is imminent. Rather, it is to what extent Raul Castro can maintain a system that is under external pressure, because it has historically based its legitimacy on Fidel’s personal leadership.

In Cuba, communist revolution and Fidel are synonymous. Now, even though Fidel will not disappear completely from the public sphere, he will suddenly not be taking the country’s most important political decisions anymore. Fidel’s departure from the public scene is, therefore, already a substantial breach from the past.

Further, economic conditions have deteriorated tremendously on the island since the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 90s. Moscow was not only Cuba’s main commercial partner, it also used to provide the country with non-negligible military and economic aid. Once that aid stopped Cuban authorities decided to look for alternative sources of dollars, mainly to maintain the country’s education and health infrastructures - considered to be the revolution’s most important achievements. The solution the local authorities found was to open the island’s doors to international tourism investors. This allowed the communist regime to earn much needed dollars to preserve the health and education systems. However it did little to improve the overall socio-economic situation of the majority of Cubans. It is not necessary to be a political scientist to understand that a combination of poor socio-economic conditions and lack of political liberties is the most common factor for regime change.

The good news for Raul Castro and his fellow gerontocrats is that there are no real opposition movements in Cuba. This is thanks mainly to the policy of repression exercised by the government since the beginning of the revolution – there are currently more than 750 political prisoners in the island.

However, in this case the winds of change might come from within: the youngest ranks of the party have started to express their discontent with the way the political and economic situation is being handled by the government. This would have been very unlikely not to say impossible two or three years ago. If divisions deepen it will be harder to continue with the policies of political repressions, and a real opportunity for an organized opposition might arise, along with a new future for Cuba.

It is not my purpose here to explore Mr Chavez’ continued agenda of interference in his neighbors’ internal affairs – given its complexity, this is a topic that should be treated separately. But as a first step it is useful to evaluate to what extent the FARC can be entitled to a legitimate belligerent status.

In intra-State wars four criteria can help determine the legitimate combatancy of armed movements: military command structure, observance of war conventions, political goals, and popular representativeness. To what extent does the FARC meet these criteria? It is true that the FARC is indeed organized along military lines. But on the other three criteria the “People’s Army” falls short.

According to the Just War doctrine, war should be governed by the principle of distinction: i.e. acts of war should be directed towards enemy combatants and not towards non-combatants caught in circumstances they did not create. Contrary to this doctrine, over the last 15 years the FARC has committed unaccountable crimes against civilians in Colombia, indiscriminately using land mines in heavily populated zones, forcing the displacement of entire towns, recruiting underage boys and girls, and carrying out a methodic policy of kidnappings - according to some estimates the FARC currently holds 750 hostages, some of whom have remained captive for more than 10 years.

On political goals, maybe the organization was conceived by its founders as a vehicle to seize power and change social structures in Colombia, as its Marxist postulates imply, and maybe at some point it represented the political and moral views of a non-negligible segment of the Colombian population. Today, however, the FARC lack a coherent political agenda and it is not daring to argue that the organization wages war for economic gain only: it has set up a vast drug-trafficking network through which it collects hundreds of millions of dollars every year. Moreover, the FARC are involved in the traffic of arms and extortion of local entrepreneurs, which are both very profitable activities. According to the BBC, the FARC probably is the richest insurgent group in the world and according to various estimates earns between USD 200-400 million each year from the drug trade.

Finally, it is extremely hard to conceive of the FARC as an organization that represents the views of the Colombian people, after the huge demonstrations that took place last month in the largest cities of Colombia, as millions of citizens showed their contempt for FARC’s policy of violence against civilians. Today, the FARC can hardly be considered to act as moral proxy of the Colombian people, or even a substantial segment of it.

The actions that the FARC has conducted during the last 15 years are those of a terrorist organization, and therefore its members are nothing but criminals. The FARC’s record on the observance of war conventions is very poor, it lacks a genuine political agenda, and it is hardly representative. It cannot be a legitimate belligerent.

Ironically, if the FARC were granted legitimate belligerent status, maybe the Colombian justice system would not be legally entitled to prosecute the organization’s main leaders, but they could then be judged by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes.

There is great virtue in the American way, which expects CEOs to perform on a quarterly basis, presidents and Congresses to reinvent politics in 100 days, generals to wipe out opponents in 100 hours without taking significant casualties, doctors to save life and limb every time, search engines to yield a million results in less than a second, and so on. There is also great virtue in the belief that what is bad can be made good, and that what is good can be made great, and that what is fractionally less than great is downright awful.

But these virtues can spawn vices. One is impatience. Another is a culture of chronic complaint. A third is the belief that every problem has a solution, that trial is possible without error, that risks must always be zero, that every inconvenience is an outrage, every setback a disaster and every mishap a plausible basis for a lawsuit.

It is often said that the Bush administration’s effort to bring democracy to the Middle East wasn’t so much a case of American idealism as it was of hubris. That may yet prove true. But is it any less hubristic to think the enterprise was ever going to be brought off without blundering time and again? It’s a thought that ought to weigh especially heavily on Mr. Obama, dream candidate of America’s great expectations.

What is perhaps most pertinent here is that last paragraph, which provides a compelling case for at least trying. It, therefore, contradicts another WSJ oped titled Democracy Has Been Demoted. Talking of the Burmese protests in October, Daniel Henninger (October 4, 2007) argued then that the principle of spreading democracy itself was out of favor:

The damage has been done. The Burmese or the voters this week in Ukraine’s fitful democracy or Russia’s Garry Kasparov–who all want what Mr. Bush described in that doctrine–should understand how far down in importance their goal has fallen in the affairs of men.

The point is this. It is easy to criticize the war for the misery it has brought on everyone. Yet, had Rumsfeld succeeded in establishing a stable State quickly he would have been heralded as a savior, not treated like a pariah. Is it right to reject the war or its principles simply because hindsight is 20-20?

The purpose, of course, is not to analyze Iraq ad neauseum. But what Iraq seems to suggest and what these two articles show is that there is a fine line between promoting democracy - and imposing it. The failure of the latter effort should not be turned into a rejection of the former.

…isn’t really a letter to you at all. This is an attempt to put words to what cannot be expressed in words. To mourn what is too immense to mourn. A clumsy groping for something beyond the word ‘heartbreak’. A futile attempt to communicate what can only be lived, moment by moment. This is a howl of anguish and rage. This is a love letter to a nation. This is a long low keening for my country.

The post is worth reading in its entirety, not only for it is emotive. But it also puts things into perspective and provides so much detail that is missing from BBC, CNN, and the other news channels. For instance, did you know that:

• When the election results were being announced, and “it became clear that you were announcing vote tallies that differed from those counted and confirmed in the constituencies, there was a sudden power blackout at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre, where the returns were being announced. Hundreds of GSU (General Service Unit) paramilitaries suddenly marched in” and evicted the media.
• “Fifteen minutes later, we watched, dumbfounded, as you declared Kibaki the winner. 30 minutes later, we watched in sickened disbelief and outrage, as you handed the announcement to Kibaki on the lawns of State House. Where the Chief Justice, strangely enough, had already arrived. Was waiting, fully robed, to hurriedly swear him in.”

So, what happened to the Election Commissioner? He resigned soon after, stating as he left that he “cannot state with certainty that Kibaki won the election.” Really? If the EC doesn’t know, who will? And if he wasn’t certain, how could he announce the results?

Interestingly enough, it would appear that the Kenya Chapter of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) is rescinding the Jurist of the Year award given to Mr. Kivuitu. And the Law Society of Kenya is strikeing him from their Roll of Honour. Clearly, not signs that he did his job well.

If this sounds overly critical consider that over the last two weeks Kenya’s much vaunted democracy, often held up as an example for the rest of Africa, has already fallen far from its once giddy heights.

My argument, that Kenyan democracy will suffer lasting damage, does not depend on whether the elections last week were actually rigged. All that matters is that a vast number of Kenyans believe the elections to be rigged.

In their opinion the Election Commission of Kenya (ECK) upheld a flawed result in order to keep a President in power. To the citizens, and to other institutions of Kenya, this indicates only one thing - that retaining Kibaki was more important than retaining democracy.

To add insult to injury, the Kenyan system provided the ODM no way to challenge the outcome. While violent protest was probably self-defeating, the party had no legitimate means of appeal. And even if such mechanisms existed, the ECK had already signaled to the citizens that government institutions existed to protect Kibaki, so what confidence would they inspire?

A Contrast with the 2000 Elections in the US
The contrast with the elections of 2000 in the US is stark. That was, by some counts, one of the most controversial elections in US history. Yet, there are two key differences with Kenya. First, in the USA the looser had several opportunities to appeal, including a mandatory recount, a manual recount that Gore asked for, and the option to go to the courts.

The second difference, however, is even more telling. When the dust had settled and Gore had still lost, his supporters did not go ransacking the country - they accepted the decision of the Supreme Court. Gore had a further chance to create a constitutional crisis: when Congress met to certify the electoral vote, he rejected objections to the election results by 20 representatives, as expected of him in his capacity as President of the Senate. Gore’s actions indicated what every American accepted as an article of faith - that the system, for all its flaws, was more important that any one result and any one person; and the Supreme Court’s decision was not to be challenged. As a judge had once remarked, “We are not final because we are right, we are right because we are final.”

What Faith in Kenyan Democracy?

Two years ago I had commended the Kenyans for rejecting a new consitution, and the ECK for holding a free and fair referendum. It had seemed then that Kenya had strong institutions. But strong institutions require strong people, and this episode suggests they are sorely lacking where it counts.

Kibaki has, no doubt, won the Presidency. But democracy in Kenya has lost. Because democracy is sustained not by elections, freedoms, institutions, or even people. It is sustained first and foremost by faith in the system. By suggesting that a person is more important than the individual, Kibaki and the ECK, have undermined that faith - and the system.

Update 2: Picking up the Pieces

Note: This was sent as a personal email to a few friends, and should not be seen as a solicitation

Things seem to be back to normal, shops are slowly filling up with produce, and fuel is no longer in shortage.

Though not all UN agencies have resumed work yet, some of the key ones, i.e. WFP and UNICEF, have deployed emergency teams in the worst areas - western, slums, Rift Valley - to set up IDP camps (Internally Displaced Persons). A colleague from UNICEF is out in Eldoret, setting up IDP camps. He says it is not pretty. He’s a watsan guy.

In some parts of the country people have lost all they had. There are donation banks set up everywhere, Red Cross vehicles roaming the streets more than usual, and taking food donations right at the grocery store gates. It’s sort of like a big disaster…like when there’s a hurricane or something. It sort of reminds me of the hurricane that hit Bermuda when I was there, and how people all pulled together to help out their neighbours.

The rally by the ODM today, was called off because the head of the African Union has finally agreed to mediate the situation. Or as the Kenyan Government says, to discuss. The Kenyan Government does not like the word mediate…it suggests like something is wrong! So they are just coming to discuss…DISCUSS!

And the foreigners? There are meetings between the heads of various missions every day (embassies and high commissions) because they are all responsible for their nationals currently in Kenya. Because this was high season for tourism, there were an abnormally high number of foreigners in Kenya when this broke out, and people were calling their embassies to be evacuated. It was a logistical nightmare…. I knew I had my ticket home on the 18th, no matter what! ha…prepare for the unlikely!

We are hoping this is the last of it all…keep your fingers crossed. Now it’s about rebuilding the country, and the esteem of the people. And getting this fake government out of office!!!

If any of you want to donate any food etc, just let me know and we can purchase stuff on your behalf. food, clothes, mattresses, etc. You can always deposit in my canadian account and I can pull it out here. It is a direct line to helping Kenya…no costs involved.

Pictures from Last Week

Lining up: Morulem polling station, Turkana

Waiting for the election results, Turkana

Police checkpoint, the road to Nairobi

Burning tires, the road to Nairobi

Protest march last Tuesday, Nairobi

Riot police in waiting, Nairobi

The situation is indeed bad, as this is a struggle of tribes. Yet, no news agency has explained just what went wrong with the elections - and why it is so evident that the results were indeed rigged. So I asked my friends. What follows has been sent to me by Anne-Marie Dilullo, a long-time resident of Kenya and founder of the Tabasamu Education Fund.

I will continue to provide updates, as long as I receive them and they remain pertinent. AMD, as she is best known, traveled from Turkana, in the far North West, to Nairobi on the 29th, witnessing substantial signs of violence. Her chronicles will follow - and if you have updates of your own, please send them in too.

Update 1: What Went Wrong?

(Disclaimer: AMD - like international observers - clearly believes the election results were flawed).

National elections were scheduled for 27th December, and campaigning had been fierce for over one year now. Kenyans vote thrice: for their local counsellor, for their consituency Member of Parliament and for the President of the country. Elections were predicted to be peaceful and well run by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). Kenya has been peaceful for a long time, and had their last elections in 2002. They are an example of progress and peace in the region and the continent.

The 3 parties putting forward candidates for President were the Party of National Unity (PNU) - Mwai Kibaki (president for the last 5 years); the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) - Raila Odinga; and ODM-Kenya - Kalonzo Musyoka (broke away from ODM shortly before nominations, to form his own party).

The real contest was between ODM and PNU. It is said that the two parties are somewhat tribally divided, ODM being more the choice of Luo, Luhya, pastoralist tribes such as Masai, Somali, Turkana, Kalenjin, Samburu, and PNU being more the choice of Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba, etc. The allegiance lines are not clear, but the assumption is generally true.

The election process was generally uncontroversial.

On the 28th, results had still not been fully tallied, but reports were slowly coming in to the ECK and news rooms, and were being tentatively broadcasted by constituency. The ODM was in the lead. Most key MPs that had, in the past 5 years, been Kibaki supporters were not re-elected, and were replaced by ODM MPs.

On the 29th, almost all results were in, save for 19 constituencies, mainly in PNU supported areas. ECK officials were saying they could not reach their officers in these constituencies. This is when the people started worrying about rigging. As results slowly came in, Raila’s (ODM’s) lead in the Presidential standing started declining, and Kibaki’s (PNU’s) stand was looking better. Slowly but surely, Kibaki was gaining ground with the 19 consituencies’ late results. Protests were made by the Press and various party agents on changing of numbers, tallying irregularities, etc. It was not looking transparent or fair at all.

Why would the people vote out most PNU MPs, and then vote in a PNU President? How could some constituencies have more votes tallied than voter turnout for those stations? How could there be fewer votes in the MP boxes than in the Presidential boxes for one station?

News Update:

• The Kenyan Attorney General has called for a recount.
• A massive “million man rally” by the ODM in downtown Nairobi was postponed to Tuesday, after riot police disrupted attempts to hold it yesterday.

This is a tragedy of colossal proportions, akin to Modi’s support of the Godhara riots. But the biggest tragedy in simply that the country’s moderate Hindus and Muslims remain silent - again. The words of anti-Nazi pastor Martin Niemöller come to mind:

First they came for the Jews and I did not speak out because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for the Communists and I did not speak out because I was not a Communist.
Then they came for the trade unionists and I did not speak out because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me.

A longer version of this article appears on Desicritics.org.

In the aftermath of this decision, three things are worth noting.

The first is the reaction of the western press. CNN, for instance, says the emergency was imposed through a “provisional constitutional order” due to “increasing violence and unrest”. Unfortunately, it is wrong on both counts. There is nothing constitutional about this order - the emergency is outside the purview of an already suspect constitution. At least the BBC is more frank in calling it, “martial law” (the NYTimes concurs). And the only unrest Musharraf has faced is of his own creation - through constant meddling with the democratic process, and failure to live up to promises made when he first siezed power in 1999. Nothing more, nothing less.

More interesting, perhaps, is the initial reaction of the US and UK. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is merely “deeply disturbed,” but it appears will do little to further the democratic process. Her past attempts to avoid this fate for Pakistan have failed, so now the US and the rest of the world must watch Pakistan play out this latest drama of democratic mockery.

Finally, this raises the question of what are the implications for India? Not good, it would appear, because India is now surrounded completely by explicitly military regimes that are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Pakistan, China, Burma, Bangladesh are all dictatorships that have little respect for India. The need for a realist carrot-and-stick foreign policy that is aligned more closely to the US becomes more evident. Time, perhaps, to revisit the Indo-US nuclear deal?