Africa

Solving Piracy: Break the Legitimacy

By Bhagirath Jogdand

The hijacking of the Maersk Alabama, the first ship hijacked by Somali pirates with an all-American crew, might be a turning point in America and Europe’s efforts to fight piracy off the Gulf of Aden. Within days French special forces stormeda hijacked French yacht, while American special forces freed the captain of the Maersk Alabama, killing three pirates. But if anyone thought this would deter pirates, they were wrong. Within days pirates had hijacked 4 more ships. At least some of these attacks were clearly in revenge for the American operation.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton unveiled a four-point plan to fight piracy. The plan has several elements, but perhaps the most defining aspect is the “more muscular approach” propagated by it. In Secretary Clinton’s words, “The United States does not make concessions or ransom payments to pirates.”

But what is the track record of more muscular efforts? Since June 2008, when the UN Security Council sanctioned military intervention (under resolution 1816), naval operations by 18 countries have succeeded in thwarting some hijacking attempts. Yet, the sophistication and range of pirate activities in the Indian Ocean has continued to increase. Hijackings can now occur as far as 350 nautical miles off the Somali coast, and have grownfrom 59 in 2007, to 184 in 2008, and 65 so far in 2009 (see NATO chart).

More muscle may not be the answer. Secretary Clinton’s plan has an uncanny resemblance to the US’ “war on drugs,” which costs the US taxpayer over USD 40 billion annually, yet has had a questionable impact on the flow of drugs into the US.

Piracy emerged as a problem after the fall of the General Siyad Barre regime in 1991, which left Somalia without an effective government. Post 1991, the only period when piracy declined or was effectively contained was when the Islamic Courts Union ruled Mogadishu for a brief six-month period, re-surfacing again when Ethiopian forces drove the ICU out of power.

For anyone wishing to address the piracy problem, the UNSC resolution and ICU rule present two extremes of enforcement codes. Their respective outcomes show the extent to which military responses can succeed – they douse the fire but piracy tends to flare again when suitable winds blow.

Understanding the Fundamental Drivers

While it is easy to blame piracy on the lack of effective governance in Somalia, there is another deeper issue at play. Somalia’s fishing industry is in crises because an ineffective government is unable to guard its coastline and EEZ, which are immensely rich in marine resources. Somali piracy, in other words, shares its origins with an intense increase in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in Somali waters – which has deprived fishing communities of their livelihoods. As the FAO notes, “there are also an estimated 700 foreign-owned vessels that are fully engaged in unlicensed fishing in Somali waters.”

It is thus interesting to note that Somali pirates claim legitimacy as being de facto coast guards. Last September, Sugule Ali, spokesman for a group that hijacked the MV Faina, said in an interview:

We don’t consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits those who illegally fish in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas. We are simply patrolling our seas. Think of us like a coast guard.

Justified or not, pirates see ransoms as fees extracted in return for illegal fishing in their waters. Of course, the ransom collected – between USD 30-150 million in 2008 – does not go into the national kitty. However, a large part of it is indeed spent in the local market. According to Peter Lehr of St. Andrews University, 700 Somali pirates directly support a shore-based infrastructure employing between 10-15,000 people. And indirect impacts are even broader, providing the impoverished masses visible economic imperatives to tolerate or support pirates. As reported by the NY Daily News, the pirate port city of Eyl now sports, “Big villas and hotels, former subsistence fishermen are driving Mercedes-Benzes and gold-digging women are showing up.”

For a country with no welfare programs piracy may be the only hope and those involved in it can seek statehood in the eyes of the people. The pirates turned patriots shall celebrate the bigger catches and the masses shall rally behind their providers. In such a scenario, how easy would it be for foreign militaries to chase pirates on the land or sea?

Break the Legitimacy

Why not break this cycle of legitimacy and win the trust of the masses first? To do so the international community needs to act urgently to return Somalia’s marine resources to the people of Somalia.

The UN estimates that illegal fishing conservatively costs Somalia about USD 100 million per year in revenue due to IUU activities by European and Asian vessels. This situation been described by Lehr as a “resource swap” with Somalis “taking $100 million annually in ransoms while Europeans and Asians poach $300 million in fish.”

The UN Convention on Law of the Sea recognizes sovereign rights of states over territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones. The absence of effective governance in Somalia has meant no controlling authority over these areas. Rather than allowing private profiteers from filling this gap, the international community and the UN should come forward and do so by establishing a Regulatory Authority for the Somali EEZ. The EEZ should be broken down into different areal sectors. Based on the potential fishery and other living stocks in each sector, the authority should decide the limits for maximum, safe and environmentally sustainable exploitation. Fix the minimum bid price for each sector depending on the varieties of stocks especially tuna, sharks and lobsters. Invite global tenders and award the fishing contracts to the highest bidders for each sector.

The proceeds of this fishing activity should go to yet another international body (a Development Commission for Somalia). The Commission would spend the money on creating productive assets in Somalia – in the fields of education, health and infrastructure – in the process creating livelihood options for the masses.

Territorial waters and some inshore areas should be reserved for traditional artisan fishing communities, with a possible tie up with foreign vessels to buy the artisan catch. The armada of 18 international navies could extend their mandate not just to fight piracy, but to ensure that only legitimate fishing occurs in the EEZ.

Conclusion

Secretary Clinton’s plan for the “war on piracy” ignores a fundamental reality – that piracy has its roots in a loss of livelihood, yet provides the fuel for pirates to gain the support of the local populace. While military actions may reduce piracy in the short term, a populace deprived of every other means of living, and desperate enough to risk lives crossing the Gulf of Aden, will certainly return to piracy.

As mentioned by Cristopher Jasparo, piracy partly reflects the failure of governance in Somalia itself. More important, it illustrates the insufficiency of a military response in combating non-state actors that represent the losers of globalization. A plan that truly solves piracy must address these realities if it is to be both effective and morally justifiable.

The plan proposed here strikes a balance between the legitimate rights of the international community for safe passage and its responsibilities to govern Somali waters “for the people,” in the absence of a functioning Somali state. It takes away the cover of national cause from pirates and shifts resource legitimacy and popular support towards the international community. Thus, it should contribute to a conducive climate for both political negotiations for government formation as well as concerted efforts in chasing the pirates and their supporters – wherever they are!

This is the first guest post by Bhagirath Jogdand, a graduating student from the International Organizations MBA program at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. He is currently working on a plan to rebuild Somali fishing communities, as an complement to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Prior to joining the MBA, Bhagirath worked for several years in the federal and state police and security services in India.

© 2009 The Discomfort Zone.