Politics

A Post-Mumbai Agenda II: Managing Pakistan

Clear evidence has emerged that the attack in Mumbai originated from Pakistan. While Pakistan’s government has denied any part in the planning it is also clear that Laskhar-e-Taiba, the main instigator, received substantial support over the years from elements within the ISI and military. What is more, Laskhar’s front organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, had been allowed to function and grow without hindrance throughout Pakistan, suggesting condonation, if not complicity.

That Pakistan had a part to play in the Mumbai attacks should surprise no one that is familiar with previous attacks in India. The most vivid is the 2001 attack on India’s Parliament, following which India mobilized its army. After several months on the brink of war, both sides pulled back, with Pakistan providing commitments to control terrorists within its borders. As we now know, those commitments were false.

Faced with repeated failures to contain Pakistan, what is India to do?

Setting the Ground Rules
Despite the desire to exact revenge, any action by India must be measured on more than the pain it inflicts. Rather, as Condoleezza Rice said, “any response needs to be judged by its effectiveness in prevention and also by not creating other unintended consequences or difficulties.” What is need, in other words, is a strategy to “manage” Pakistan, rather than to retaliate to it.

So far, India’s response has been measured and calm. India has depended on the US to exert influence on Pakistan, yielding some results. Pakistan has arrested Lashkar terrorists, closed offices of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and placed its founder (Hafiz Mohammad) under house arrest. India’s maturity in avoiding military retaliation is good news. After all, we have tried military mobilization before and gained nothing. An outright military intervention not only risks escalation into a nuclear conflict, it would be counter-productive – alienating liberal forces within the establishment while uniting the country against India.

There is, however, a second yardstick by which action must be measured. It must send a clear message to Pakistan that support of terror is not a viable option. As Pranab Mukherjee has said, “mere expression of intention is not adequate.” That those responsible may have been non-state actors is irrelevant. Action by India must clarify that non-state actors are the responsibility of States that harbor them. Even if the state in question – Pakistan – is only in partial control of its apparatus, that does not excuse those in charge, of their responsibility.

This analysis suggests India’s response must balance two opposing forces. First, India must send an unequivocal message that it is serious about its security and will punish those it sees as responsible. Simultaneously, however, India must accept that Pakistan is a state teetering on the edge of failure – and in some regions it is a failed state. Extreme reactions, such as military intervention, risk aggravating that situation.

Building A Strategy
So far, India has borne the brunt of this tradeoff. Under US pressure India did not cross the LoC during the Kargil war, did not take direct military action in 2001, and has avoided a similar action this year. The status quo has favored Pakistan.

This must change. Indeed, India’s strategy must be two pronged. First, India must change the status quo, using Mumbai as an excuse to dramatically shift negotiating power in its favor. Second, Pakistan must be made to face this tradeoff as well. By offering both carrots and sticks, India must drive home the point that Pakistan has choices and stands to loose everytime it condones terror against India.

Sizing Response Options: The Stick
So, where does this leave us? There are several ideas India can employ, as potential sticks:

• Inflict Economic Pain: Perhaps the easiest retaliation is non-military. India has several economic tools at its disposal, including stopping all imports from Pakistan, banning overflight by Pakistani airlines, and significantly restricting travel between the two countries. No doubt, Pakistan will retaliate, but the pain will be asymmetrically more for Pakistan.
• Covert Retaliation: In the immediate aftermath of Mumbai, some commentators suggested that India follow Israel’s example, after the Munich massacre, of covertly hunting down those responsible. Indeed, India should prepare for such action. It is doubtful if India has the capabilities for such an operation. Nevertheless such an action would carry many benefits, despite Pakistan’s efforts to prosecute those responsible. Not only will it force India to upgrade its capabilities, it will also be a useful backup option should Pakistan later release those responsible. It would be a clear signal to Pakistan (and the USA) that if it does not act, India will.
• “Surgical” Strikes: The logical escalation of covert operations is actual military intervention. One option is to conduct “surgical” strikes in Pakistan, but particularly in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) at suspected terror camps. This can be done. India seems to know with reasonable certainty where these camps are. Yet, such strikes risk uniting Pakistan against India, strengthening the fundamentalists, and most critically, alienating India globally. Consider, after all, that US airstrikes in Pakistan’s west are already highly controversial. Strikes by India, the country’s arch enemy, would weaken Zardari while strengthening those elements in the ISI that have long supported Laskhar and their brethren. This, therefore, would be foolhardy and probably defines the threshold that India cannot easily cross.
• All-out Assault: There is one exception where a military assault on Pakistan should be considered – in the immediate aftermath of a Mumbai-style attack. Should such an attack happen again, India can – and should – launch a limited but intense attack on the PoK. Of course, such an assault would have to be limited to Kashmir, have clear geographical objectives, and be ceased unilaterally within hours or days to avoid escalation. Nevertheless, by taking back occupied territory India can improve its strategic position and change the status quo that has long been in Pakistan’s favor.

Sizing Response Options: The Carrot
Of course, giving Pakistan “the stick” is counter-productive, without a few carrots as well. So, here’s a few:

• Sharing Intelligence: In the past Pakistan has always demanded that India share intelligence to backup its claims that attacks are supported from within Pakistan. India should oblige and call Pakistan’s bluff. Indeed, to the extent possible, India should make some intelligence public. Not only will this substantiate India’s case globally, it would eliminate one more excuse for inaction by Pakistan. India can then demand intelligence in return – and again measure if its rivals words are mere “expression of intent.”
• Joint Military Exercises: As an out-of-the box method, why not propose joint military exercises with Pakistan’s government, and possibly joint patrols in the border regions of India – and Afghanistan? Obviously, this won’t happen overnight given Pakistan’s suspicions. Nevertheless, it would give India the opportunity to size up its neighbor’s intentions – to prevent cross-border terrorism. Should it become evident that Pakistan is not living up to its side of the bargain, in stopping infiltration, India could then take retaliatory measures.
• Economic Free Trade Zone: The strongest incentive India can offer – and should offer immediately – is economic. For instance, President Zardari indicated an interest in creating a free-trade zone. Such a plan has long been under discussion. Now, India should unilaterally offer to cut tariffs on all Pakistani imports. Pakistan would benefit in the short term but this would strengthen moderate elements in Pakistan. Best of all, it would give India additional future leverage over Pakistan, by making the threat of sanctions that much more painful.

Retaliation Is a Balancing Act
The Mumbai attacks have led to a lot of soul searching in India, resulting in some very creative thinking (for instance, some have suggested a reunification of South Asia). It is a testament to Indians’ desire for peace that, rather than baying for blood, they are thinking positive. Nevertheless, Indian policymakers must operate within the realm of reality.

But India cannot, and should not, depend on US pressure alone to alter Pakistan’s track record of harboring terrorists.

Having all but ruled out military action, India has given Pakistan’s government the necessary cover to pursue terrorists domestically without alienating itself. But India cannot, and should not, depend on US pressure alone to alter Pakistan’s track record of harboring terrorists. After all, Pakistan’s army seems to doublecross itself and the Americans. So it is highly likely that once that pressure is gone Pakistan will return to its erring ways. To avoid that, what is needed is a long-term, sustained, and consistent policy on rewarding Pakistan for good behavior and punishing it for bad.

India should start by offering a range of incentives that draw the two countries close. This will strengthen Pakistan’s liberals and, if nothing else, stabilize the country – a result India should desire anyway. Nevertheless, India must simultaneously prepare for, and execute, covert operations that provide India a “second” lever.

This is the conclusion of a series of articles on the Mumbai attacks. Previous articles looked at what went wrong and lessons for India’s domestic security apparatus.

© 2008 The Discomfort Zone.