Politics

A Post-Mumbai Agenda I: Fixing Internal Security

This is part of a series on articles on the Mumbai attacks, and analyzes actions India should take to fix domestic security. The next, concluding, part will look at the specific challenge of retaliating to Pakistan.

Slowly a picture has emerged of how the Mumbai attacks were planned and executed, mostly in Pakistan. The NY Times highlights evidence that Pakistan was the source of the attackers and the group behind it had received substantial support from the ISI. The report quotes not just the Mumbai police, but former Defense Department officials.

A picture is also emerging of the “rot” in India’s own criminal justice and intelligence systems, pointed out most effectively by the BBC.

The attacks and their aftermath again point to the rot that has set into the country’s internal security system and a lack of cohesion between civilian and security wings of the government…One telling example: six days after the attack, even the number of dead and injured keeps going up and down, due to poor co-ordination between the police and hospitals.

The Prime Minister has pledged to act with “resolve and determination” but what does that mean? The temptation to lean on Pakistan is strong, yet India’s government might do better to learn a few basic lessons first. Here are a few.

Win the Information War

First, learn to win the war for world opinion. This should hardly be difficult, given the immense sympathy India has garnered over the attacks. Yet, the government can bungle this too.

For one, constant allusions to “external elements” and “neighbors” do not help. India has made it a habit of crying wolf and pointing to Pakistan everytime anything goes wrong. This, unfortunately, increases the burden of proof on India. That India pointed to Pakistan within hours of the attacks suggested either prior knowledge or – more likely to the public eye – the usual fearmongering. That is why an NY Times article is more credible when it quotes the US Defense Department, than the Mumbai police or Shivraj Patil. Make your words count.

Second, be consistent and professional in releasing information. If there is one thing that marked the operations in Mumbai, it was the many contradictory statements released in turn by the head of the NSG, an Army General, the Mumbai police commissioner, and the Home Minister. Protecting the credibility of information is as important as protecting the information. It was never clear who exactly was in charge of the operations, leading the bystander to believe that no one was in charge.

Finally, control the channels by which information is released. Is it not surprising that to find “evidence” of Pakistan’s involvement, one has to go to the NYTImes? Why is the Home Ministry not releasing the evidence and ensuring that its security officials not “leak” information to the press?

Get Security Right

Winning the information war is about getting perceptions right – that India’s authorities are in control and not simply smoking pot when they accuse Pakistan. If India can convince the US and Pakistan that it knows what it is doing, it will also convince them of the earnestness of India’s words – and if necessary, threats.

But you cannot have others believe you are serious if your house is in disarray. And India’s security apparatus certainly is. Nine hours for the NSG to get to Mumbai, three days to get the terrorists, and another two days to clear out bombs from the train station at Mumbai!

To be taken seriously, India must fix its anti-terror mechanism. And a first step is to invest heavily in the local police. The local policeman is India’s first defense against crime and terror. It is these people – long reviled and under paid – who face the first bullets, secure crime scenes, and call in the big guns. You cannot expect to be safe if these people are not motivated to protect you. Fixing the local police will not be easy, nor cheap. It requires that every state pay its policemen more, invest in better training, offer better equipment and a safer work environment, and improve communications across state police and military intelligence divisions. The creation of a “federal” agency or a stronger law is useless, if we cannot catch the people to begin with.

Second, leverage technology. Britain’s enthusiastic adoption of video surveillance in the 1990′s, in response to IRA attacks, shows how successful it can be – at least in managing the aftermath. Today, London has over 10,000 cameras, and Britain over 4 million (1 for every 14 people – the highest in the world). The cost of technology, critical to coordinating first-response between fire, medical, and police services, is dropping exponentially. There is really no excuse for why India’s police forces still operate with WWII era walkie talkies.

Third, upgrade the NSG to be one of the best anti-terror response units in the world. India is one of the most frequently attacked countries – it needs to have a matching capability. Yet, in the BBC article a security analyst illustrates how the NSG have no dedicated aircraft and insufficient training in responding to a Mumbai-style attack:

The commandos have been trained to rescue small groups of people. “They have not been trained on multiple location operations of such scale.”

Four, India needs to be creative in its training of the NSG – and this will come from working with more creative partners. Why not train with Israeli and US security forces on a regular basis? Their agencies, amongst the best in the world, would not only be willing to share intelligence, but also tactics. Mumbai shows that whether we like it or not, the terrorists see us as one group of enemies. So it is time we embraced our new allies.

Finally, the NSG should be a dedicated anti-terror unit, not a team meant to provide protective cover to corrupt politicians. In the USA, the Secret Service does not conduct anti-terror operations, just as SWAT, Seal, and other special forces teams do not provide individual protection services. The former is dedicated to protecting key people, the latter to anti-terror operations. Likewise, the NSG should not be wasted on protecting corrupt politicians, the bulk of whom should be protected by local police. And, doing so would have the added benefit of creating incentives for politicians to improve local law enforcement.

Mumbai: An Opportunity to Reflect

Mumbai was a wake-up call. It seems increasingly likely that the attack was planned in Pakistan, yet the inability to prevent it or to respond effectively was a domestic failure. It brings home the rot, not only in our police system, but in our politics.

In such an environment, it is easy to lash out at an “external party” and in time India must do so. Yet, Mumbai offers us the opportunity to look within before we look without. India’s first act of determination must be to set our own house in order. It will be difficult and politically tricky for the Congress to admit to lapses. But if the government is serious about tackling terror, they must follow the advice of an earstwhile opponent, Iqbal:

Khudi ko kar buland itna ke har taqdeer se pehle khuda bande se khud poochhe bata teri raza kya hai