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Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Avoiding the Brink

This is the concluding article in a 2-part series. Part 1 tested the assertion that the normal dynamics of nuclear deterrence would work in South Asia.

Nuclear deterrence has come full circle. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), established in 1964 in response to the first nuclear tests by India, recently approved a waiver for nuclear trade with India. Regardless of whether the US Congress finally backs the 123 Agreement, India is now very much within the nuclear mainstream and expects to quickly expand nuclear power generation capacity. According to critics, however, this also allows India to expand its nuclear weapons program (a comprehensive discussion of the deal’s criticisms was previously posted).

Yet, the possession of nuclear weapons is not a sufficient condition for deterrence in South Asia. Indeed, as previously discussed, mutually assured destruction will not lead to stability here as it did between the US and USSR. This presents a quandary for the international community. Avoiding the prospect of nuclear war requires engagement. Yet, engaging India and Pakistan on their nuclear weapons risks legitimizing those weapons. How are countries to respond?

Pragmatism suggests the international community can engage in three areas to mitigate the unique problems of nuclear deterrence in the subcontinent, without crossing the threshold of legitimizing nuclear weapons.

Asserting Civilian Command and Control
Part of the problem of nuclear instability stems from the role of the military in Pakistan, severe limitations in the command, control and intelligence structures of both countries, and technical deficiencies in the handling of nuclear weapons. These problems could lead to non-conventional confrontation in South Asia.

One of the most difficult tasks, therefore, is to reduce the likelihood of military biases in Pakistan leading to preventive or unintended nuclear war through the implementation of sustained civil control over the men in uniform. It is unclear if the military is willing to give up its current influence, but with the impetus of a new government and a political compulsion to fighting terror that is increasingly domestic, the international community could begin a process of negotiations to separate the military from nuclear weapons control.

Simultaneously, both countries can also benefit from stronger command and control structures. The likelihood of unintended war can be mitigated by sharing with India and Pakistan the know-how that the two former cold war opponents developed to avoid mismanagement that could lead to a nuclear confrontation.

Improving Weapons Safety
Equally primordial to the international community should be to provide technical assistance in the development of a safer and more secure nuclear arsenal in both India and Pakistan. The key point here is to improve weapons safety and security, without enhancing their readiness. To this end the five ‘legal’ nuclear powers could share information on electronic locking devices, weapons safety design improvements and personal reliability programs and offer assistance in the implementation of a physical security system to protect nuclear weapons storage sites.

Increasing Transparency and Predictability
Third, the international community should persuade India and Pakistan to follow certain ‘healthy’ ways of nuclear behavior: each side must accept that military victory over the other is not possible; neither country must use the fear of non-conventional war to attempt to change the political and territorial status quo; and both states should avoid initiating or escalating bilateral crises, particularly those that have the potential to escalate to military and eventually to nuclear confrontations.

One initiative that could contribute to stability would be an agreement to station observers in the other state, a move that would provide a level of transparency regarding the nuclear armaments of both India and Pakistan, eliminating the opacity factor and its dangerous consequences. The international community could strengthen such an effort by providing technical assistance to establish modern and reliable channels of communication between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Conclusion: Building Lasting Peace
These short-term measures can be just that - short-term. They cannot be seen as legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, it should be clear to both Indian and Pakistani authorities that they are only instruments conceived to correct the short-term deficiencies of their nuclear policies. This is not merely a matter of principle. By institutionalizing the possession of nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of conflict, these measures could undermine the prospects of long-term arms control.

Therefore, these measures cannot be treated independent of the ultimate aim of an arms control regime strong enough to impede the fabrication and testing of new non-conventional armament (even if it does not seek their total elimination).

As a first step, both countries could be encouraged to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), constraining the development of new weapons. Correctly applied, this instrument may also aid the long process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The international community should also expend efforts towards halting India and Pakistan’s production of weapons grade fissile material, while drafting a treaty for the cut-off of fissile material. Finally, it is also advisable to encourage the limitation of the development and deployment of nuclear capable missiles and aircraft in both South Asian countries, and propose other measures of strategic restraint.

In the short term these three recommendations could help in the establishment of a more stable nuclear deterrence system in South Asia. In the long term, some of them could also serve to facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament. Many of these measures involve complicated negotiations and may be very difficult to implement. However, if at least one of them is concretized the security in the subcontinent will have improved remarkably, reducing the risks of a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. And, principles of non-proliferation notwithstanding, no energy should be spared towards the achievement of such a goal.

© 2008 The Discomfort Zone.