Politics

Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Will it Work?

“The Cold War did not evolve into a hot one because of the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the USSR”. This is one of the most common reasonings for why the two superpowers did not wage war against each other between 1945 and 1991. It also contains one of the basic assumptions of nuclear deterrence: through mutually assured destruction, nuclear weapons prevent war.

Today, almost 17 years after the Cold War there is another conflict that presents some of the characteristics of the superpowers’ confrontation: the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Since 1947 these two nations have frequently collided and been in a near state of war for extended periods of time, each of them dubious about the territorial ambitions of its neighbor.

After their independence, India and Pakistan were involved in a series of conventional wars. But in the last twenty-five years, and contrary to the mandates of international law, these South Asian countries have acquired nuclear weapons, changing completely the regional strategic scenario. Yet, the nuclear factor has been used by some scholars and experts to explain the absence of major recent confrontations between these two neighbors.

Can the same precepts of nuclear deterrence theory, used for the Cold War, be applied to this conflict? Or are there some peculiarities that make strategic deterrence inapplicable in South Asia?

These are questions that I will try to answer. I will concentrate, particularly, on four aspects of the South Asia context: the level of institutionalization of control over nuclear weapons, the technological capabilities of both countries to handle non-conventional weapons, the lack of transparency they have shown regarding their nuclear arsenals, and the presence of non-state actors.

Level of institutional control
During the cold war, both the Soviet Union and the United States built a complex management system to ensure appropriate control over their nuclear weapons. In both cases the heads of state of both nations had ultimate say about their use.

This does not seem to be the case in South Asia. Neither Islamabad nor New Delhi has managed to establish and demonstrate a reliable communications system that can guarantee the functioning of the regular chain of command. Not only is this problematic in and of itself, but by suggesting lack of control it breeds miscalculation of adversary actions or intentions and may lead to unnecessarily hasty decision-making.

Another aspect that must be considered is the role of the military in each country. In the South Asian dispute the military, mainly on the Pakistani side, has demonstrated that it has a major say on the use of non-conventional weapons. Voices in the military branch have made it clear that they will retain the option to use nuclear weapons as a response to a conventional Indian attack.

Level of technological control
During the Cold War, concomitant to the development of non-conventional weapons the superpowers created sophisticated technological mechanisms to prevent accidents that could have triggered a nuclear response.

The dangers of nuclear weapon accidents and even accidental war are very high when armaments lack safe design features and are inappropriately assembled. Moreover, when there is interplay of mutual expectations about a possible surprise attack and a lack of early-warning systems, the adoption of aggressive positions may be forced, creating a vicious cycle that ends in precipitous overreactions.

Neither Pakistan nor India possess accurate intelligence or warning systems. Therefore the possibility of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, by accident, cannot be ruled out. Their weak control systems and the relative inexperience in managing nuclear weapons make it possible to cross a ‘line in the sand’ unintentionally.

The Opacity Factor
In the period corresponding from 1950 to 1991 the superpowers constantly publicized the number of nuclear weapons they possessed. Moreover, they were very specific about the characteristics of these armaments. The main reason for this transparency was to make the rival aware of the capacity of executing a second strike in case of a preemptive nuclear attack. This is considered to be one of the basic elements of nuclear deterrence strategy.

In the South Asian crisis a different phenomenon is evident. In this case the actors have not developed an open policy regarding their nuclear arsenals. In fact, the posture of India and Pakistan is one of opacity: there is constant uncertainty regarding the number of nuclear weapons they possess, their location and readiness for use, and the plans that have been made for their delivery.

Uncertainty regarding the size, location and readiness of an opponent’s nuclear force could induce caution. But it can also lead a nation to underestimate an opponent’s will or ability to respond, emboldening it to escalate a crisis or to preempt.

The presence of non-state actors
In Cold War nuclear deterrence there were basically two well-identified actors, which made strategic planning for both countries easier. However, in South Asia - but particularly in Pakistan – there are fundamentalist organizations that see the initiation of a nuclear confrontation in the region, as being in their own interest. These organizations operate independently, outside the influence of the government.

Islamic movements acting in Pakistan could seek to destabilize the region, carrying out a terrorist attack of such magnitude that New Delhi would be obliged to retaliate with nuclear weapons. These fundamentalist groups would profit from a war with India that led to the destruction of an independent Pakistan, for non-state actors have better chances to be successful only in failed, collapsed and war-torn states.

Conclusion
The Cold War was a conflict with peculiar characteristics in which the actors developed very clear ways of behavior regarding their nuclear strategies. The South Asian conflict, however, presents different features and its actors are not following the same nuclear policies elaborated during most of the second half of the twentieth century. The institutional and technological aspects of this standoff increases the risk of nuclear interchange in the region. Moreover, factors such as the presence of non-state actors with interests in the conflict also conspire against a peaceful coexistence. Too many factors indicate that nuclear deterrence may not work in the region, and the next confrontation between these two states could be a nuclear one.

What are the options? Assuming that nobody wants a nuclear conflict, how can the international community move both countries to a safer status quo - should the international community encourage both countries towards nuclear disarmament; is that even a realistic option?

This is part one of a two part series. Part two will analyze the prospects for nuclear disarmament and other options for a safer South Asia

© 2008 The Discomfort Zone.