Politics | South Asia

Concluding The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Moving Beyond Blame

All hell has broken loose in the Indian parliament since the 123 Agreement was concluded between India and the USA. Following its conclusion the UPA government faces rebellion from the Left (the communists), the right (the BJP), and within. The imbroglio has been sufficiently covered in both domestic and international media, and seems to the result of domestic politics, posturing, and egos. It is not my purpose to add to that verbose discussion. Rather, I wish to ask simply: how can the government conclude this agreement?

The Frame of Reference: What is the Agreement About?

That begs another more fundamental question: what is this nuclear deal about and is it in India’s favor?

Many justifications have been given for this deal – among them access to nuclear technology, China, and Pakistan. Each successive justification has been met with resistance from a different quarter, leading M.K. Bhadrakumar to note that, “No one in the Indian establishment is able to explain cogently what this nuclear agreement is all about.”

To move forward, let us drop all pretensions about this deal. The Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation agreement is not about “nuclear cooperation,” but about Indo-US cooperation.

Even that, however, is a near-term means to a more significant long-term end. The deal sets a precedent for India to create a country-specific niche for itself in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and establishes that it can alter the international system to its benefit. The agreement, therefore, is about India’s ability to bend the rules of the international system to its benefit.

The stakes for India are, essentially, very high. Much higher, in fact, than the Prime Minister has been able to articulate. His inability to place the deal in this context is at the heart of the current stalemate; for while the government has been deft at bargaining internationally, it has been incompetent at doing so domestically.

Discrediting the Naysayers and their Arguments

Getting domestic political support in parliament on the deal requires two concomitant actions. The first is to discredit the arguments of the right and the left. Thankfully, this is easily done - once the correct “frame of reference” is articulated.

The Left argues that Indians do not want to align with the US. This is plain wrong. Most Indians care more about their next meal than about foreign policy. Those that do not have such existential worries - the middle class - remain largely pro-American, as revealed in many international polls.

The Communists’ ideological opposition is hardly surprising given its history of undermining India’s very existence - during colonial rule they worked against the nationalists; in the post-independence era they actively conspired against the government to encourage a communist revolution taking orders from China or Russia. Their position proves only that they support their ideology, not India. Their support is unlikely, and therefore inconsequential.

The BJP has a more technical concern - that the deal restricts India’s foreign policy. This is, true, but it is not a criticism of the deal. That is because the agreement does not bind India’s hands any more than they are bound at present. For instance, under the Hyde Act the US will be required to end cooperation if India tests a nuclear weapon. However, if India were to test a nuclear weapon now, sanctions would still follow. If anything limits India’s foreign policy, it is not the deal but how important the PMO considers it. And to say that the agreement will limit India’s foreign policy options is no criticism at all – because India’s options are already limited.

IAEA and NSG Agreements: A Package to Keep or Loose

The second action to develop domestic consensus needs to be to present a face saving compromise for the left but particularly the right. For political reasons neither can abandom their current position, unless presented with a situation that either seems to vindicate their current position or makes it indefensible.

There is only one situation that does so. It requires India conclude agreements with the IAEA and the NSG, then present all three agreements as a package for approval to parliament.

This strategy, of moving forward with the NSG and IAEA, has several benefits. First, time is of the essence - the US Congress must approve the entire deal early next year before campaigning starts in earnest for the presidential elections. Second, it will illustrate that the agreement has broad support, including from China and Japan. This will take the bite out of the left’s argument that this is only about the US. And, by allowing India access to diversified suppliers, it will alleviate the Right’s concern that the agreement may tie India’s hands.

It is not an accident that the US administration will present the 123 Agreement, the IAEA safeguards agreement, and the NSG agreement to the US Congress as a package. A vote on the package, rather than on specific sections, presents US policymakers with a stark choice - to vote in favor of, or against, “strategic cooperation” with India. Faced with that choice only an ideologue, and only one impervious to the strong Indian lobby, would vote against the entire package. The Indian administration needs to do the same, rather than allow a parochial legislature veto power on every segment of international deal making.

123: Not the Endgame

The 123 Agreement is not, as some might say, the end game. Rather, it should be viewed as the start of India’s involvement in developing friendly international frameworks.

Even the current agreement is the first of three, two of which are yet to be concluded. In the ensuing negotiations with the NSG, the current imbroglio in parliament is actually beneficial to India, because domestic constraints in the form of the legislative-executive divide significantly strengthen India’s bargaining position. Of course, using that as leverage requires the Prime Minister extract himself from a stalemate of his own making.

The only way forward for the government is to explain what this deal is about - the rise of India on the international stage. That rise is aided by America, but is not for it. Second, the government must present the deal’s opponents with a stark choice – to support India’s aggressive and independent foreign policy, or not.

© 2007 The Discomfort Zone.